likely successor to the Chancellor; and that Prince Bismarck had been foretold, when a young man, by a clairvoyant, that he would become one of the greatest men in Europe, but he would be displaced by a man connected with the sea. He rid himself of Stolsch, but the clairvoyant won, for Caprivi, an Admiralty man, is now the Imperial Chancellor."

The writer then goes on to state that there is a certain aged astrologer in London, to whom kings, princes, and nobles apply for his advice on the most important matters; and that Prince Bismarck himself has more than once consulted this man, before taking a momentous step.

The current numbers of the *Whitehall Review* contain some exceedingly favourable notices of the present movement in France towards a return to the great religion of the East; quoting, in its issue of 24th May, from a letter received "From a Correspondent," who writes as follows: "May we not hope that the 'prominent University professor (M. de Rosny, of course), whose lectures on Oriental Religions just now are creating quite a *furore* in fashionable circles in Paris,' as the *Whitehall Review* has been telling its readers, is right when he asserts that Buddhism has some thirty thousand followers in France?.....Many of us do not know much about the Buddhist religion, but most have a well-grounded belief that it inculcates mercy, justice, and loving-kindness....." and much more to the same effect. The more literary *Spectator*, too, has lately opened its columns to a correspondence on "Transmigration," and in its last issue devoted an article to one of the letters which has appeared; this has of course afforded an admirable opportunity for our literary brethren of the Theosophical Society to "rush into print" in explanation and defence of the more scientific doctrine of Re-incarnation; an opportunity of which they have not been slow to avail themselves.

A. L. C.

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सत्यात् नास्ति परो धर्मः ।

THERE IS NO RELIGION HIGHER THAN TRUTH.

[*Family motto of the Maharajahs of Benares.*]

*PALMISTRY: ITS ORIENTAL PHASE.**

THIS science is a part of the science of Samudrika, which treats of the interpretation of the marks of the human body. Samudrika is so called from Samudra, an epithet of Siva, from whom it is said to have originated. The science is a branch of the Tantra Sastra, which is mostly in the form of a dialogue between Siva and Durga. The human body is examined under twelve heads: 1. Kshetra (body); 2. Mrija (complexion); 3. Swara (voice); 4. Sara (strength); 5. Samhita (joints); 6. Sneha (gloss); 7. Varna (color); 8. Anuka (shape of the face); 9. Unmana (height); 10. Mana (strength); 11. Prakriti (disposition); 12. Gati (gait). Of these, the first contains a description of the various parts of the body—the soles of the feet, the toes, the shanks, the knees, the thighs, the rump, the loins, the abdomen, the navel, the folds of the skin, the nipples, the bosom, the collar bones, the neck, the arm pits, the shoulders, the anus, the hands, the chin, the lips, the tongue, the face, the ears, the cheek, the nose, the eyes, the temples, the forehead and the head. That branch of the science which treats of the lines and marks in the palm of the hand is known as Palmistry—the subject of the present article.

In the case of a man the palm of the right hand should be examined, and in the case of a woman, the palm of the left hand should be examined.

If the palm contain marks of the shape of a fish, the person will succeed in all his attempts, will acquire much wealth and will have many sons.

If the marks be quadrangular or of the shape of a pair of scales, or of a Vajrayudha†, the person will be a merchant and will acquire much wealth.

* All remarks about colors and complexions apply of course to the brown races of India.

† Vajrayudha: a weapon of the shape of a quoit, but with a broader circumference, and a smaller hole in the centre.

If the marks in the palm of the hand be of the shape of a bow, a sword, an octagon, or the petals of the lotus, the person will respectively be a warrior, a provincial governor, or a king.

If the marks be of the shape of a Sankha (conch shell), a Chakra (discus), or a Dhwaja (flag-staff), the person will respectively be a learned man, a Pandit or a Vedic student.

If the marks be of the shape of a trident, or a mortar, the person will be a king, and will take delight in acts of gift, in the performance of Vedic rites, and in the worship of the Dewas and the Brahmins.

If the marks be of the shape of a spear, a javelin, a club, an arrow, an axe, or a chariot, the person will become a king.

If the marks be of the shape of an Ankusa (an elephant driver's hook), or a Kundala (a circular ear-ring), the person will become a great king.

If the marks be of the shape of a hill, a bracelet, the uterus, the human head, or a vessel, the person will become a king's minister.

If the marks be of the shape of the sun, the moon, a creeper, a triangle, a house, an elephant or a horse, the person will be very rich and happy.

If the marks in the palm of the hand be of the shape of a Bilva tree, the sacrificial pit, the sacrificial post, a Chamara (the bushy tail of the Bos grunniens), a garland, a cross, an umbrella, a crocodile or a cow-shed, the person will be a king.

If three lines issuing from the wrist of the hand reach the middle of the palm, the person will be a king, and if there be two marks of the shape of a fish in the middle of the palm, the person will feed many people.

If the lines in the palm of the hand be of the shape of the sacrificial altar, the person will perform sacrificial rites.

If the lines be of the shape of a tank or temple, the person will do acts of charity.

If the palm of the hand contain the mark of a single Chakra (discus), the person will be skilled in speech; if there be two such marks, he will possess many virtues; if there be three such marks, the person will be a tradesman; if there be four, he will be poor; if there be five, he will be exceedingly beautiful; if there be six, he will indulge in sexual pleasures; if there be seven, he will live in great comfort; if there be eight, he will be afflicted with diseases, if there be nine, he will be a king; and if there be ten, he will acquire supernatural powers.

If the palm of the hand contain the mark of a single Sankha (conch-shell), the person will live in comfort; if there be two such marks, he will be poor; if there be three such marks, he will possess no virtues; if there be four such marks, he will possess many virtues; if there be five marks, he will be poor; if there be six, he will be vastly learned; and if there be from seven to ten marks, he will be a king.

If the marks in the middle of the thumb be of the shape of a barley seed, the person will eat sumptuous meals and be happy.

If the marks at the root of the forefinger and the middle finger be of the shape of a barley seed, the person will possess a wife, sons, and wealth, and be happy.

If the thumb be marked by a vertical line, the person will be a king or a commander of armies, and will be rich and will die before 60.

If a vertical line be found to end at the root of the forefinger, the person will serve under a king and be happy, giving up a virtuous course of life.

If a vertical line be found to end at the root of the middle finger, the person will have sons and grandsons, and will be rich and happy.

If a vertical line be found to end at the root of the ring-finger, the person will acquire wealth by tilling lands, and will get sons and grandsons, and will be both happy and unhappy in life.

If a vertical line be found to end at the root of the little finger, the person will reside in foreign lands, and will live for 100 years.

If there be a single line at the root of the fingers, the person will perform sacrificial rites; if there be two lines, he will be liberal in gift; if there be three lines, he will be virtuous; if there be four lines, he will become a king: if there be five lines, he will be learned; if six, he will be famous and will rule over men; and if seven, he will suffer disgrace.

The line which commences from below the root of the little finger and ends at the root of the forefinger is called the Ayur Rekha—line of life, and indicates 100 years; and if the line be short, the age of the person will suffer a proportionate reduction.

If the Ayur Rekha end at the root of the middle finger, the person will live for 60 years, and if the Ayur Rekha be found to be thin and short, there will be misery and early death.

Of the two lines in the middle of the palm which unite between the thumb and the forefinger, the one next to Ayur Rekha is known as Pitri Rekha—line of father; and the other is known as Matri Rekha—line of mother. If the former be found unbroken, the person will be one of legitimate birth, and if it be broken, he will be one of illegitimate birth. If the Pitri and Matri lines be red and long, the person's father and mother will be of long life, and if they unite well between the thumb and the forefinger, they will live in harmony with each other.

If there be too many lines between the Pitri and Matri Rekhas, the person will suffer miseries, and if there be too few lines, he will be poor. If there be small figures between the lines, such as a trident, a discus, an octagon, and the like, the person will be happy.

If the vertical line at the root of the thumb be large, the person will get sons, and if it be small, he will get daughters. If the line be long and unbroken, the children will live long; and if it be short and broken, they will suffer early death.

The big lines below the thumb indicate sons and the small lines indicate daughters.

If the palm of the hand contain too many lines or too few lines, or if the lines be black, the person will suffer miseries. If the lines be

of red color, he will be happy. If the lines appear twisted like a rope, the person will be rich.

If the four fingers contain 3 lines each or 12 lines in all, the person will be rich and happy. If the fingers contain 13 lines in all, the person will be poor and miserable and afflicted with diseases. If the fingers contain 15 lines in all, the person will be a thief; if they contain 16 lines, he will be an expert gambler; if they contain 17 lines, he will do wicked deeds; if they contain 18 lines, the person will do acts of charity and be happy. If the fingers contain 19 lines in all, the person will be respected by other people and will be intelligent; if they contain 20 lines, he will practise austerities and will be a Yogi; and if they contain 21 lines, he will be a Mahatma.

If the little finger be of the same length as the ring finger, the person will live for 100 years. If the little finger should end above the upper joint of the ring finger, the person will live for 90 years. If it should end at the upper joint, the person will live for 80 years; if it should end just below the upper joint, the person will live for 75 years; if it should end just *above* the middle point between the upper joint and middle joint of the ring finger, the person will live for 70 years; if it should end just midway between the two joints, the person will live for 60 years; if it should end just below the middle point between the two joints, the person will live for 50 years, and if it should end lower still, the person will be of short life, and will suffer miseries.

The Finger Joints.

The thumb.—If the thumb contain a single chain-like line at any joint, the person will be obeyed by other people. If the line of the central joint appear split up, the person will be rich; and if it be a single line, he will be a wanderer. If the tip of the thumb contain a line of the form of a whirl, turning to the right, the person will be very wealthy; if the line turn to the left, he will be of long life.

The forefinger.—If there be a single line at the root of the forefinger, the person will be poor; and if there be several lines at the place, he will win success in fight. If there be a single line at the central joint, the person will be a miser; and if there be several lines at the place, he will be deceitful. If there be a single line at the upper joint, the person will be learned; and if there be several lines at the place, the person will be deceitful. If there be a right whirl above the upper joint, the person will be wealthy; and if there be a left whirl at the place, he will be of sound views.

The middle finger.—If there be a single line at the root of the middle finger, the person will be wealthy; and if there be several lines at the place, he will suffer miseries. If there be a single line at the central joint, the person will be learned; and if there be several lines, he will indulge in sexual pleasures. If there be a single line at the upper joint, the person will enjoy little comfort; and if there be several lines, he will live in luxury. If there be a right whirl above the upper joint, the person will eat sumptuous meals; and if there be a left whirl, he will eat poor meals.

The ring finger.—If there be a single line at the root of the ring finger, the person will be happy; if there be two lines at the root he will wear jewels; and if there be several lines, the person will win success in fight. If there be a single line at the central joint, the person will be a wanderer; and if there be several lines at the joint, he will protect his kinsmen. If there be a single line at the upper joint, the person will travel to foreign lands; and if there be several lines, he will be very lewd. If there be a right whirl above the upper joint, the person will be courteous; and if there be a left whirl, he will be talkative.

The little finger.—If there be a single line at the root of the little finger, the person will be deceitful; and if there be several lines, he will be a buffoon. If there be a single line at the central joint, the person will be beautiful; and if there be several lines at the joint, he will be of long life. If there be a single line at the upper joint, the person will succeed in all his attempts; and if there be several lines, he will be poor. If there be a right whirl above the upper joint, the person will be of long life; and if there be a left whirl, the person will be powerful.

The number of lines below the root of the little finger and by the side of the palm indicates the number of wives a person will marry.

If the palm of the hand be hollow, the person will not inherit his father's property; if it be round and hollow, he will be rich; if high, he will be generous; if red, he will be rich; if yellow, he will cohabit with women under prohibition; and if dry, he will be poor.

If the nails resemble the husk of paddy, the person will be impotent; if flat and split, he will be poor; if of bad color, he will be of wrong views; and if red, he will be a king.

If the fingers be long, the person will live in comfort; if they be without skin-folds, he will be popular; if they be small, he will be intelligent; and if they be flat, he will serve under other men. If the fingers be large, the person will be poor; and if they be bent upwards, he will die by weapons.

If the hands be like those of the monkey, the person will be rich; and if they be like those of the tiger, he will be wicked.

If the back of the hand be soft and rising, the person will be fair and wealthy; if the back be disfigured by muscles, the person will be poor; and if it be covered with hairs, the person will be a miser.

Tirukattupallee. N. Chidambaram Iyer.

Note :—A good deal of the above reads like a farrago of nonsense in the absence of accessible palmisters who might—like Mrs. Cotton, Miss Baughan, Mrs. St. Hill, Mr. Heron Allan, and other living Western proficients—practically demonstrate the accuracy of their system. The Indian "Samudrika" might properly be given the name Prof. Buchanan invented, forty years ago, for his system of body-study, viz., Sarcognomy (a Greek compound, with the meaning expressed in the above compound English word). It is more complete than any of our Western systems, because it not only associates certain bodily marks with certain defined temperaments, hence natural tendencies and capabilities, but moreover traces the physiological facts to the planetary, akasic, and elemental (*i. e.*,

nature-spiritual) causes. Of course, the first thing one asks is whether there are Indian palmisters who can emulate our Western professionals in palm-reading and prognosis. Mr. Chidambaram Iyer, answering my question, says :—

"Palmisters are not generally found in this part (Tanjore District) of the country. The science may be said to be almost dead from want of encouragement. Some of my friends have occasionally met travelling religious mendicants who have made correct predictions, some of them reading past and predicting future events from an inspection of the hand; I can give an example. A couple of years ago, a Malayalee stopped for nearly six months in a village not far from here and was found to possess a very wonderful knowledge of palmistry. He would examine the hands of a dozen persons within the space of half an hour and make surprisingly correct predictions. My brother was told by him that he would shortly sell out all his property, and depend for his support upon his only son. This has just now become a fact. My nephew is a graduate and has just been given an appointment in P——, and my brother goes there to-morrow to live with him!"

Does not this bear me out in the suspicion I expressed in my notice of Mrs. Cotton's book, in the June Number—that there was some other factor involved in the palmister's predictions and retrospections than the mere lines, mounts and measurements in the hand? I have always suspected that the rule holds with respect to the astrologer's, cartomancer's, phrenologist's and physiognomist's revelations. It would be a neat experiment to get each of these classes of adepts to close their eyes and speak out what came into their minds about the visitor without touching pencil, card or skull: in short, to rely entirely upon psychometry and what Major Buckley used to call "conscious clairvoyance." At all events, palmistry cannot be said to be on a really scientific basis at present, although its proficients do often make very accurate revelations of our past experience and sometimes startling previsions of the future.

I remember one case in point, among many. When Mme. Blavatsky and I were going from Bombay to Ceylon in the B. I. Steamer *Ethiopia*, in the year 1880, she was one day playing a game of *Patience* by herself. The Captain, Wickes, a great bluff, hard-headed old fellow, who believed no more in occult science than he did in Symmes' Hole, strolled up and mockingly asked her to tell his fortune with the cards. She refused, but he would not take her denial, and finally she shuffled the pack, laid them out, and looking at them with close attention, at last said; "This is strange: the cards say you will soon leave the sea and settle in some position on land!" "I wish with all my heart that were so, I should like nothing better: but you'll have to try again," said the Captain. The cards were again shuffled, but with the same result, and so the matter was passed off with a laugh. We stopped about two months in Ceylon and then returned to Bombay. Shortly after, Madame Blavatsky received a letter from Captain Wickes telling her that, most unexpectedly, he had upon arrival at Calcutta been offered the post of Harbour Master at Mangalore (?) had accepted, returning from Calcutta as a passenger in his own ship, and at the date of the letter he was filling the post in question. This was, of course, a case of conscious (*i.e.*, waking) clairvoyance, and the cards had nothing to do with the prophecy.

H. S. O.

VARAHA-UPANISHAD OF KRISHNA-YAJUR VEDA.

(Translated by the Kumbakonam T. S.)

(Concluded from page 557.)

V. ADHYAYA.

THEN Nidháka asked Lord Ribhu to enlighten him as to the rules to be observed in the practice of Yoga. Accordingly he (the Lord) said thus—

This body is one of the nature of (or composed of) the five elements. It is filled by five Mandalas[1] (spheres). Hardness (of the body) is of Prithivi (earth element), one of them; moisture is of Ap (water element); brightness is of Téjas (fire element); motion is the property of Vayu (air element); that which pervades everywhere throughout the body is Ákas. All these should be known by a student of Yoga. Through the motion of Váyu-Mandala in this body (there are caused) 21,600 breaths every day and night. If there is a diminution in the Prithivi-Mandala, there arise folds in thebody; if there is diminution in the essence of Ap (water), the hair begins to grow grey; if there is diminution in the essence of Téjas (fire), there is less of hunger and lustre (in the body); if there is diminution in the essence of Váyu, there is incessant tremor (in the body); if there is diminution in the essence of Ákas, one dies. The Prána (vital airs) which rest on these five elements having no place to rest (in the body) owing to this diminution of the elements, rise up like birds flying up in the air. It is for this reason that they (Pránas) are called Uddyána (lit. flying up). With reference to this there is said to be a Bandha (binding, also meaning a posture called Uddyana Bandha, by which this flight can be arrested). This Uddyána Bandha[2] is to (or does away with) death as a lion to an elephant. Its experience is in the body; so also the Bandha stated before. It is dangerous to bind them in the body (vital airs), except as stated below. If there is the agitation of Agni (fire) within the belly, there will be caused much of pain (within). Therefore this (Uddyána Bandha) should not be practised by one who is hungry or who has got urgency to make water or void excrement. He should take many times in small quantities healthy (proper) and moderate food. He should practise Mantra[3] Yoga, Laya Yoga and Hata Yoga, through mild, middling and transcendental methods respectively. Laya, Mantra and Hata Yogas have each (the same) eight subservients. They are Yama,[4] Niyama, Ásana, Práná yáma, Prathyáhára,

(1) They are Múládhára (Sacral plexus), Swádhishtána (Solar or Prostatic plexus), Manipúraka (Epigastric plexus), Anáhata (Cardiac plexus) and Visuddhi (Laryngeal or Pharyngeal plexus). They are situated respectively in the anus, the genital organs, navel, heart and throat. The last or sixth plexus is omitted here, as the five plexuses mentioned above correspond to the five elements. This chapter treating on Yoga is very mystical.

(2) This is one of the postures treated of in Siva Samhita and other books.

(3) There are four kinds of yoga—the fourth being Raja yoga. Mantra yoga is that in which perfection is obtained through the pronunciation of Mantras. Laya Yoga is that in which perfection is obtained through Laya (absorption).

(4) They mean respectively—forbearance, religious restraint, posture, restraint of breath, subjugation of the senses, contemplation, meditation and intense self absorption.

Dhárana, Dhyána and Samádhi. Of these Yama is of ten kinds. They are non-injury and truth, non-coveting, continence, mercy, rectitude, patience, courage, moderate eating and purity (bodily and mental). Niyama is of ten kinds. They are Tapas (religious austerities), contentment, belief in the existence of God or Vedas, charity, worship of Iswara (or God), listening to the exposition of religious doctrines, shame, a good intellect, Japa (mutterings of prayers) and Vritha (penances). There are postures beginning with Chákra. Chákra, Padma, Kúrma, Mayúra, Kukkuta, Veera, Swastika, Bhadra, Simha, Mukta and Gómukha, ásanas (the postures) enumerated by the knowers of Yoga. Placing the left ankle on the right thigh and the right ankle on the left thigh, and keeping the body erect (while sitting) is the posture called Chuckra. Pranayama should be practised again and again in the following order, viz., inspiration, restraint of breath and expiration. (Thus) the Pranayama done through the nadis is called the nadis themselves.

The body of every sentient being is 96 digits long. In the middle of the body, two digits above the anas and 2 digits below the sexual organ, is the centre of the body (called Múládhára or Sacral plexus). Nine digits above the genitals there is Kántha, which is oval shaped, four digits long and four digits broad. It is surrounded by fat, flesh, bone and blood. In it is situate a nádi-chákra (centre of nerves) having twelve spokes. The *Kundalini* by which this body is supported is there. That *Kundalini* is covering by its face the Brahmarandhara of Sushumna. (By the side) of Sushumna are the nádis Álambasa and Indrakukur. In the two spokes next to it are Varuna and Yasaswini. On the spoke south of Sushumna is Pingala. On the two spokes next to it are Púsha and Payaswini. On the spoke west of Sushumna is the nádi called Saraswati. On the two spokes next to it are Sankhini and Ghándári. To the north of Sushumna is Idá; next to it is Hastijihvá; next to it is Viswódara. In these spokes the 12 nádis convey the Váyus from right to left (to the different parts of the body). These nádis are like, (*i. e.*, interwoven like the warp and woof of) cloth. They are said to have different colors. The central portion of the cloth (here the collection of nádis) is called the Nábhi-chakra (navel-plexus, which is the epigastric plexus). Jwalanthi, Nádarúpini, Pararandhra and Sushumna—these four nádis are of ruby color. These are called the basic support of náda (spiritual sound). The central portion of Brahmarandhra is often covered by Kundalini. Thus ten váyus move in these nádis. A wise man who has understood well the course of nádis and váyus should, after keeping his neck, head and body erect, with his mouth closed, contemplate upon Tureeyaka (Átma) immoveably at the tip of his nose, in the centre of his heart and in the middle of his Bindu[1], and should see with a tranquil mind through his (mental) eyes the nectar flowing from it. Having closed the anus and drawn up the váyu through (the repetition of) Pranava (Om), he should free it through (or make it enter) Sree Beeja. He should contemplate upon his Átma as Sreesakti. (Then he should contemplate as being bathed by nectar

(1) (Lit.) germ. Its seat is between the two eyebrows.

(or he should enjoy the bliss arising from nectar). This is Kálavanchana (lit. time deceiving[1]. It is the stage when (or it is the means through which) whatever is thought of by the mind is accomplished by the mind itself. This is the most important of all. (Then) Agni (fire) will flame in Ap (water), and in the flame of Agni will arise (its) branches and sprouts (viz., its sparks, &c). The words uttered about, and the actions done regarding the universe, are not lost. By checking the Bindu in the path, by making the fire element burn in the water element, and by causing the water to dry up, the body is made firm. He contracts simultaneously the A'nus and the Yóni (the part above it). He should draw up Apána and unite it with Samána. He should contemplate upon his Átma as Siva and then as being bathed by nectar. In the central part of each spoke he should concentrate Bala (will or strength). He should (then) try to go up by the union of Prána and Apána. This most important Yoga brightens up in the body the path to Siddhis (psychical powers). As a dam across the water serves as an obstacle to the floods (so this body is to the Jiva). He should know the Chaya (either light or shadow) of the body. This Bandha is said of all nádis. Through the grace of this Bandha, the dévata (goddess) becomes visible. This Bandha of four parts checks three paths. This brightens up the path through which the Siddhas obtained their Siddhis. If Prána is made to rise up soon along with Udána, this Bandha checking all nádis goes up. This is called Sampúta Yoga or Múla Bandha.[1] Through the practising of this one Yoga, the three Bandhas[2] are mastered. By practising day and night intermittingly or at any convenient time the Váyu will come under his control. With the control of Váyu, Agni (the gastric fire) in the body will increase daily. With the increase of Agni, food, &c., will be easily degested. Should food be properly digested, there is the increase of Rasa (essence of food). With the increase of Rasa, there is the increase of Dhátus (spiritual substances.) With the increase of Dhátus, there is the increase of wisdom in the body. Thus all the sins collected together during many crores of births are burnt up (by the fire of wisdom).

In the centre of the anus and the genitals, there is the triangular Múládhára (sacral plexus). It illumines the seat of Siva of the form of Bindu, where there is the Kundálini or Parásakti. From that seat Váyu arises. From that seat Agni becomes increased. From that seat Bindu orginates and Náda (spiritual sound) becomes increased. From that seat Hamsa is born. From that seat Manas (uncertain mind) is born. The six plexuses beginning with Múládhára are said to be the seats of Sakti (goddess). From the neck to the top of the head is said to be the seat of Sambu (Siva). To the Nádis this body is the support (or vehicle); to Prána the Nádis are the support; to Jiva, Prána is the support; to Hamsa, Jiva is the support; to Sakti, Hamsa is the seat and the locomotive and fixed universe.

(1) This is a kind of posture mentioned in Sivasamhita.

(2) The three Bandhas (postures) are Jalandhara, Uddyána, and Múla-Bandha.

Being without fancy (or delusion) and of a pure mind he should practise Pránáyáma. Even a person who is well-skilled in the practice of the three Bandhas should try always to cognize with a true heart that principle which should be known and is the cause of all objects and their attributes. Both expiration and inspiration should (be stopped and made to) rest in restraint of breath (alone). He should depend solely on Brahm, which is the aim, and which seems to be other than himself. The (not taking in of (external objects is said to be Réchaka (expiration). The (taking in of the) spiritual knowledge of the Shastras is said to be Púraka (inspiration), and the fixing within (or the digesting) of such knowledge is said to be Kumbhaka (restraint of breath). He is an emancipated person who practises thus with such a Chitta. There is no doubt about it. Through Kumbhaka (restraint of breath) Váyu should be always taken up, and through Kumbhaka alone it should be filled up within. It is only through Kumbhaka that Kumbhaka should be firmlymastered. Within it is Paramasiva. The Váyu which is motionless in this state should be dispersed through Kántá-Mudra (posture). Having checked the course of Váyu, having become perfect in the practice of expiration and restraint of breath, and having planted evenly on the ground the two hands and the two feet, he should aim at the four seats through Vayu with the aid of the three Védhakas.[1] He should strike against Mahá-Méru[2] with the (aid of) Prakótees (forces) at the mouth of Váyu. Drawing the two Puta (parts) Váyu shines. The union of Moon, Sun and Agni should be known on account of nectar. As the Méru moves, the Dévatas who have their abode in the centre of Méru move likewise. At first in his Brahma-Ghranthi (knot) there is produced soon a hole (or passage). Then having pierced the Brahma-Ghranthi he pierces the Vishnu-Ghranthi. Then he pierces the Rudra-Ghranthi. Then the Yogi becomes Védha (piercing) through his liberation from the impurities of delusion, through the religious ceremonies (performed) in various births, through the grace of Gurus and Dévatas, and through the practice of Yoga. In the Mandala (sphere or region) of Sushumna (situated) between Idá and Pingala, Váyu should be made to rise up through the posture known as Mudra-bandha. The short pronunciation[3] (Hrasva) of Pranava (Om) frees (one) from sins. The long pronunciation of it (Deergha) confers (on one) Moksha. Its pronunciation in Plutha Swara (tone) gives (him) eternal bliss. He is a knower of Veda, who through the abovementioned three ways of pronunciation knows the head (or end) of Pranava, which is beyond the power of Vák (speech), like the never ceasing flow of oil or the perfectly audible bell sound. The short Swara (Hrasva) is in Bindu. The long Swara (Deergha) is in Brahmrandhara. Plutha is in Dwáthasántha (12th centre). The Mantras should be repeated on account of getting Mantra Siddhis. This Pranava (Om) will remove all obstacles. It will remove all sins. There are four states predicated, of this are Árambha, Ghata, Parichaya and Nishpaththi. Árambha is that state in which one having abandoned external Karmas performed by the three organs (mind, speech and body), is always engaged in mental Karma only. The wise say that Ghata state is that in which Váyu having forced an opening in the Western side, and having there become full, is firmly fixed there. Parichaya state is that in which Váyu is firmly fixed to Ákás, either associated with Jiva or not associated with it while the body is immoveable. It is said that Nishpaththi is that Avastha (state) in which there take place creation and dissolution, through Átma, or that state which a Yogi having become a Jivanmukta performs Yoga without effort.

Whoever recites this Upanishad becomes immaculate like Agni. Like Váyu he becomes pure. He is freed from the sins of the theft of gold. He becomes free from the sin of drinking spirits. He becomes a Jivanmukta.

(1) Lit. Means piercing.

(2) Stands for Sushumna.

(3) There are three kinds of pronunciation (for instance a vowel) with 1 mátra, 2 mátras and 3 mátras. They are respectively Hrasva, Deergha, Plutha, which may be translated as short, long, and very long.

STRIKING HOME.

Chapter III. Mr. Lewin.

(*Concluded from page* 583.)

MY night was spent in a state of mental perturbation, never experienced before, and my agitation only calmed down in the morning to some extent, when I had asked Mrs. Watkins to obtain for me an interview with Mr. Lewin.

His presence alone exercised a protective influence on me, infinitely strengthened by the cordial and genial words, in which he tried to soothe my visible emotion.

I am sure the account I gave him of the occurrence was very confused and barely intelligible, yet he listened patiently and did not irritate me by frequent questions. I saw he considered very deeply before he spoke.

Far from upbraiding me for having neglected to carry out his instructions, his words as well as their tone were gentle and encouraging. By speaking of Dr. Henry as our common adversary, he made me feel how warmly he espoused my cause, and that I possessed a true friend to support me in my heavy trial. His assurances of victory soon proving contagious, a wonderful calm gradually drove away all former nervous excitement. Then half musingly and barely addressing me he said:

"I have often been tempted to write an essay on what is commonly called 'Cursing and swearing.' Though repelling at the outset, it is a highly interesting subject under its occult aspect; but I have been always deterred by the fear of being misunderstood. No one can possibly have a greater abhorrence than I have of the vile habit of using blasphemous or disgusting language, as the outflow of impatience or the result of low companionship. Yet the question: What could be the real cause of the origin and tenacious existence of so base and reprehensible a custom? never ceased preoccupying me, until I began to trace the theory which forms its foundation.

"Our will, ever dynamic, is constantly acting on all our surroundings. Its force of action, however, is determined, firstly by its innate power, secondly by the intensity which propels or energizes it, and thirdly by the amount of resistance at its objective point. In vigorously exerting our will to an outer action, it is just as if a portion of its force were packed into a bomb with a fuse and thrown with more or less vehemence against a resisting obstacle.

"No motive power exists in the so-called expletive, which merely forms the vehicle for conveying the living force to the striking point. The will itself is the creator of the shock of concussion, which acts like an exploding petard in removing an inert mass. Soldiers and sailors do not hesitate to affirm that under exceptional circumstances a command accompanied by an 'oath' will call forth a decidedly quickened response; they are however unaware why it is that when such an order is given in a sharp and energetic tone, somewhat resembling the crack of a whip, its effect becomes more distinctly apparent. I could tell you of many singular facts, proving how animals instantly overcome their reluctance to obey by being 'sworn at,' when it is obvious that the meaning of the expressions used can in no way contribute to the act of submission."

"Now, Miss Standish," he continued with a merry twinkle in his eyes, "I should be very sorry if you thought me anxious to persuade you to train for a course of 'bad language.' If you have followed me attentively you will have understood what insignificant value resides in the words themselves, in proportion to the service they have to render in transferring into action that concentrated power of the human will, which is the real lever in human life. The lesson however to be learnt from my illustration, will be useful and applicable to your case.

"Your failure, so far, in developing a strong resisting force to Dr. Henry's aggression, is due to your will having remained in too negative a state, instead of having a positive backbone put into it. Let us take, for example, the situation of the commander of a small fort, besieged by an enemy. His duty is to provide means for self-defence of so effective a nature, that the whole strength of garrison and fortifications being put forward, the utmost degree of resistance can be relied on. He will not only see that all the material and mechanical parts are flawless, but he will essentially rely on the morale of the men under his command. This he will best succeed in securing by keeping his small troop in a state of thorough efficiency for taking aggressive action, hence prepared at any favorable moment to inflict serious damage on his besiegers. Now the opportunity for a sally may never arise, but the resisting power of the fort will have been raised to the highest possible point of development, by positive, instead of purely negative, measures of defence.

"You see, it is the constant readiness for any emergency which is at the bottom of strength. In your case, the strong aversion and loathing you experience act, to a certain extent, like protecting ramparts, but this inert character must not be allowed to constitute the whole of your defence. From their latent condition they must be routed into an active one, and by stimulating your just indignation, you must feel ready to pour forth your angry reproaches on your tormentor in the strongest terms at your command. These feelings of active wrath and contempt for his cowardly persecution will create in you a sensation of security, as if you were covered by an impenetrable armour, and that fact alone will give you every advantage in a possible struggle.

"I sincerely trust your courage may never be put to the painful test of an encounter, but remember, if you keep yourself thoroughly prepared for it, I assure you without a moment's hesitation that the victory will be yours."

Mr. Lewin certainly had the gift of infusing fresh life into my drooping spirits, and I left him with a new and very welcome feeling of confidence in myself. His explanation and advice preoccupied me very deeply. Though my understanding was somewhat slow in grasping his theory, I soon perceived that a little practice in the method counselled, produced some marked effects.

During the busy hours of the day I was forced to keep my thoughts concentrated on my work, but in my solitary walks, by letting my mind dwell on Dr. Henry's conduct and possible aims, the presence of a threatening danger stood out in clearer lines, and kept adding new fuel to my intense abhorrence of him. I prepared myself for a possible meeting, and soon felt so valiant that could I but meet him "in the flesh," I was quite ready to do battle. I had the curious sensation of being an arsenal stocked with a vast amount of moral projectiles, all ready to be exploded at him with a vigour of action I never dreamed of possessing. Thus armed and prepared, feelings of strength and reliance grew up within me, which I noticed with much gratification, when all my aims and thoughts were unexpectedly turned into a much more pleasant channel, by the contents of a letter from my Aunt Bessie.

The dear old soul enclosed a £5. note, adding that she hoped this remittance would help me a good bit towards the execution of my plans. She concluded,—"We are firmly looking forward to your early arrival, and are delighted at the idea. Though our house is but a plain farmhouse, the warmth and love you will find will do more than anything on earth to soothe and cheer you after your terrible trouble."

The exuberance of joy this letter caused me is impossible to convey in words. With one stroke the realization of all my hopes was within the grasp of my outstretched hand. In my state of exultation I was ready to burst out into a loud and joyous song like a lark escaping from its hated cage.

Aunt Bessie's contribution hastened the moment of my departure by ten weeks! Only the day before, in spite of my plodding work, the end seemed to me almost beyond my reach! The state of my funds would now have enabled me to start on the morrow, had I not undertaken to finish some copies which would keep me fully employed for another fortnight. But what enjoyment I now found in my task and its steady diminution! Everything seemed rosy tinted sunshine around me, in spite of the dismal November gloom everybody complained of. I felt a different being after

all the trials I had undergone; I allowed nothing but happy thoughts to be my companions, and my mind was entirely diverted from those currents that had swayed it so long.

At last the eve of my departure had arrived. My few preparations were nearly completed, and I had just returned to my room from my last interview with kind Mr. Lewin. In bidding him good-bye I was overcome by strong emotion, called forth by the almost tender manner he showed me, and the warm "God speed" with which he sent me on my travels. He very kindly undertook to dispose of my type-writing machine, which being of no further use to me, would certainly prove an expensive and cumbersome piece of luggage.

Still under the impression of Mr. Lewin's kind words, I was sitting in my arm-chair, when I recollected that my locket required a new ribbon to make it quite secure for the journey. I had placed it beside me on the table, while looking through my work-box, when suddenly a violent shock of cold fell upon me. In an instant I realized the hateful presence. Dr. Henry was standing in front of me in the same attitude as before, only from his finger-tips I saw extending towards me bunches of light, whose rays seemed to shoot out in my direction. So keenly was I alive to the impending danger, that for a few moments, by a stiffening of my whole resisting power, I kept the terror which was invading me successfully at bay. Slowly, however, as if yielding step by step to a superior force, I felt myself pressed back and held down by a weight irresistible, implacable, and yet as soft as air. My head began to reel, my consciousness was on the point of departing, in vain did I make a supreme last effort to rise, only to sink back into my chair, helpless and paralysed. In this movement my arm, sliding along the table, brought my hand into contact with my talisman. I clutched it instinctively as a drowning person will grasp a straw, and the effect upon me was that of a miracle. An electric shock starting from the locket swept through me like a vivifying breath. In an instant my brain was clear, a rush of nervous life coursed through my veins with rising vigour, my will responded to my impetuous call, and a passionate anger seemed to leap out of my body, straight at the vile figure in front of me. An indescribable frenzy of hatred, such as I hope never to feel again, seized me and so completely dominated me, that I only felt conscious of a vast store of energy suddenly let loose, whose further course I was no longer able to restrain. Driven by an uncontrollable impulse to violent action, which shot through me like a fiery blast, I seized a heavy tumbler from the table, and hurled it with all my might at the odious phantom. The missile struck the face in full, seemed to pass right through it, and was shivered to pieces against the door-post behind.——The apparition had vanished.

The whole occurrence though occupying only the space of a few seconds, was of so soul-stirring a nature, that I was utterly exhausted, and readily burst into a flood of tears.

Yet, when the excessive strain was lifted from me, I could hardly believe in the reality of the past scene, had it not been for the pieces of broken glass which confronted me by their overwhelming testimony. I understood that although taken unawares and pitted against a will more powerful than my own when unaided, I yet had been able to thwart a most fiendish design; and deep gratitude to my kind old friend filled my heart, for the efficient help I owed to him.

The sensation of power I felt pervading me acted in a remarkable soothing way, and very soon my nervous agitation gave way to a wonderful composure and calmness.

On the next morning by six o'clock, after a most affectionate leave-taking from dear old Mrs. Watkins, I set out on my journey to Southampton with the brightest pictures of hope and joy dancing before my eyes.

CONCLUSION.

My journey was as prosperous as it was uneventful. The welcome I received from my aunt and her family was so genuinely warm that I settled down very quickly in their midst, and under the effects of a peaceful existence, all my past troubles, at all events in their extreme acuteness, faded away, to let in their turn a feeling of happiness and security grow up.

About ten days after my arrival, when busy one evening with removing the last remnants of my goods from my trunk, I came across some photographs which brought all my English remembrances back to my mind. What a change had come over my life within a short month! With the image of Mr. Lewin, the half-forgotten fact of my talisman forced itself upon my attention, and started in me once more that craving of tantalizing curiosity, always reluctantly suppressed, of knowing its mysterious contents. I had so completely closed with the stormy past, that without much difficulty I succeeded in persuading myself this little insignificant locket had now amply fulfilled its destiny, and in my happy surroundings could be of no further use to me.

To break it would have been the easiest as well as the quickest way of satisfying my eager wish, but the fear of injuring what I most desired to examine, counselled a gentler mode of proceeding. In vain did I attempt to scrape off enough of the hard coating to find an indication of an opening.

It was only when having recourse to the candle, and trying heat, that I had the satisfaction of seeing the thin crust bubble and burn like sealing wax or shellac. In the rounded off rim I soon laid bare a clink, apparently running right round the circumference; but not before repeated exposures to the flame and considerable charring of the wooden case was I successful, by inserting the blade of my knife, in forcing the lid to yield. It was evidently one of those small wooden cases wherein engravers like to send out specimen-impressions of a seal. Its edges had been carefully pared down and neatly finished, while the whole had been covered with a dense substance, which rendered it perfectly air-tight and damp proof. It opened at last, and my excitement was intense, when removing the lid, I eagerly peered into the little round hollow.

My disappointment, however, can hardly be conceived, for besides a few white hairs, more than half shrivelled up by the action of

the flame, there was only a small slip of paper, browned and partly burnt, on which, with the closest scrutiny, I could barely trace a few indistinct letters of, to me, unknown character!

The next morning I received a letter from Mr. Lewin containing a money order, representing the value of my type-writing machine, which, through his kind endeavours, had brought a very fair price.

A postcript was added to the following effect: "I re-open my letter to tell you of a very strange piece of news.

While waiting half an hour ago at the chemists to have a preparation made up, Dr. Leigh, with whom I have a slight acquaintance, entered the shop. I heard the chemist enquire how Dr. Henry was progressing, and my curiosity being aroused, I asked Dr. Leigh for further particulars."

He expressed surprise at my not having heard what had happened, and continued:—"Well, last Friday night, Dr. Henry's old servant came to me in a great hurry with a message from her master, calling me to him without delay. On our way to the house I found her in a singular state of agitation. She told me that, fully convinced of her master being at work in his study, as she had not heard the house door open, although sitting in kitchen close by, she was suddenly startled by a most violent ringing of the study-bell, and hastening to the call. was horrified to see him lying on the couch, with his handkerchief over his face and blood streaming through his fingers. All he said was: 'I have met with an accident on my way home, run for Dr. Leigh at once.'

"I found Dr. Henry still in the same position and so blinded by the blood as to be perfectly helpless. He, however, told me that hurriedly walking home across a dark and deserted part of the common, he had stumbled over a heap of refuse, and falling, his face had struck with such vehemence on some pieces of broken glass, that he had had the utmost difficulty in finding his way to his house. I examined the wounds, removed some large splinters of glass deeply imbedded in the lower part of his forehead, and after putting on a bandage, left him to calm down from the evident excitement he was labouring under.

"For the first few days I was apprehensive of the loss of sight of one eye, for a deep cut had been inflicted on the eye-ball, besides the considerable flesh wounds immediately surrounding it. Had inflammation set in, the case might have been very serious. But fortunately the remedies I was at once able to administer prevented all further mischief. I am happy to say all danger is now removed, soon he will be quite restored, although he will wear a very ugly scar for the rest of his days."*

"NADIE."

* The phenomenon of the transfer of a wound or bruise from the projected condensed "double" to the physical body (sthula sarira) is called "repercussion." It figures largely in reports of cases of "witchcraft" or sorcery. O.

SYMBOLISM IN THE "CHIN-MUDRA."

ALL human figures represented in drawing or sculpture in any country in the posture of "Samadhi," are invariably represented with this "Chin-Mudra" *i. e.*, with the thumb and the index finger in both the hands so joined together as to form a circle. The figures of Lord Buddha—in metal, wood and stone—even in far-away countries where the original tenets of the Founder have become corrupt, represent him with this "Mudra," sitting in Samadhi or standing erect as a Teacher of the Law. Some of the figures of the Lord Buddha which were brought by our Colonel Olcott from Japan, also bear the "Swastika" (the cross with bent points) on the breast. The stone figures of Agastya Rishi, of Thayumanavar, and of the other occultists of this Tamil country and elsewhere, give a striking proof of the universal representation of sages in Samadhi with this "Chin-Mudra." In Mantra Sastras various "Mudras" or signs are given, which to an ordinary reader are meaningless; but to an occultist, offer a complete representation of the planes and workings of occult forces, both in the Microcosm and the Macrocosm. The pentagram, the cross, and the double interlaced triangles surrounded by a snake biting its own tail, though appearing to unintelligent observation merely so many fanciful diagrams, reveal to an earnest occult student, natural spiritual truths. On this head Dr. Hartmann writes thus:

"A sign like a letter or a word is useless unless it conveys a meaning and unless that meaning is realised by him who uses the sign. The more the difficulty encountered in comprehending the meaning of symbols and allegories, letters and signs, and the more the study required to understand them correctly, the more will the efforts used for that purpose strengthen the will and assist to realise the idea. The Poetry of Shakespeare or Schiller, the eloquence of Demosthenes or the logic of Plato will have no effects on him who listens to them without understanding that language and the most potent magical signs are useless drawings to him who cannot realise what they mean; while to him who is versed in occult science, a simple geometrical figure, even a line or a point, conveys a vast meaning."

Nature herself exhibits some of her rarest beauties in geometrical figures, as for example in crystallization and other states as well as in animal and vegetable forms; thus showing that the representation in symbols is a spontaneous natural phenomenon, and consequently that our ancestors have gone with nature in representing occult truths and experiences in symbolical language. There is an old legend that on a certain occasion all the disciples approached the Lord Siva for the solution of some knotty metaphysical doubts. But when they reached his presence, he (Siva) sat with his hands making the "Chin-Mudra" while he remained motionless in the posture of Samadhi. He spake not, nor did they dare address him; but no sooner did they (the disciples) see him in that posture, than the light of knowledge flashed into their confused minds, at once their doubts vanished, and the abstruse problems of "existence" were completely solved. The illustrious Sankaracharya humorously expresses the idea in the following strain:—

"It is really a wonder. The Guru is young instead of being old, and the pupils are old instead of being young. The Guru was silent instead of teaching, and thereby the students were completely relieved of their doubts."

A wonder, indeed; the process of teaching being quite contrary to the ordinary one. The Guru is ever young, because he has practically realised this "Chin-Mudra," and the Chelas are old, being subject to the miseries of death and birth, owing to their ignorance of this symbol.

Then what is this "Chin-Mudra" the realisation of which secures "Mukti," and through which the Lord Siva taught the solution of the riddle of riddles by "Mounam" or silence?

The important points which occupy every neophyte's mind are the questions of the real nature of human existence and the way to rid ourselves of the illusions by which we are surrounded in this material, phenomenal life-plane? Samadhi-Moksha in miniature is a state where the individual ideation is *en rapport* with cosmic ideation; or, to put it in the language of the Aryan philosophers, the individual soul is merged in the universal, and is become one with it in eternity; living "neither in the present nor in the future, but in the eternal." Various sects have got various theories upon this head, and we shall presently see how this "Chin-Mudra" solves and settles the difference. The finger which is between the thumb and the middle finger is that used by one and all throughout the whole world to point out or *individualise* things, and hence it stands for the "Individual soul," and the thumb being the prop and support for the working of the other fingers is symbolical of the "Universal soul." So, the joining of these two fingers so as to form a circle means that the individual and the universal souls do merge in each other and become one at the time of Moksha and its precursor Samadhi. Then what does the circle mean? The following apt and well expressed quotations from "The Secret Doctrine" will amply indicate its philosophical and symbolical rationale.

"The one circle is Divine unity, from which all proceeds and whither all returns. Its circumference—a forcibly limited symbol, in view of the limitation of the human mind—indicates the abstract, ever an incognisable presence, and its plane, the universal soul, although the two are one."

"The spirit of immortality was everywhere symbolised by a circle; hence the serpent biting its own tail, represents the circle of wisdom in eternity."

"In the Secret Doctrine the concealed unity—whether representing Para Brahm or 'the great existence' of Confucius, or the deity concealed by Phta, the eternal light, or again the Jewish Ensoph—is always found to be symbolised by a circle."

"The idea of representing the hidden deity by the circumference of a circle, is one of the oldest symbols. It is upon this conception that every great cosmogony was built. With the old Aryans, the Egyptians and the Chaldeans, it was complete, as it embraced the idea of the eternal and immoveable divine thought in its absoluteness, &c....."

"God is a circle, the centre of which is everywhere and the circumference nowhere."

The following quotation is quite pertinent to the subject-matter of the present article.

"Something of the divine and the mysterious has ever been ascribed, in the minds of the ancient philosophers, to the shape of the circle. The old world, consistent in its symbolism with its *Pantheistic* intuitions, uniting the visible and the invisible Infinitudes* into one, represented deity and its outward veil alike-by a circle. This merging of the two into a unity and the name Theos, given indifferently to both, is explained and becomes thereby still more scientific and philosophical. It is a perpetual never—ceasing evolution, circling back in its incessant progress through Æons of duration into its original status—Absolute Unity."

Hence "Chin-Mudra" teaches or symbolises that the union of Jivathma with Paramathma is the goal of all the truly spiritual minded, and that by so doing alone man can rid himself of Mayavic illusions which involve him in birth, death, and other miseries. The other three fingers which are kept stretched are the creative, the preservative and the destructive powers of nature; the three Gunas—Sathwa, Rajasa, and Thamasa; the three bodies and planes; and in fact all the triads which constitute the basis of this material and manifested world. Further it (Chin-Mudra) teaches that so long as the pointing finger of Jivathma was in close union with the other three fingers of phenomenal triads, union with the thumb† of Paramathma was impossible and only by its (the pointing finger's) complete separation from them (the triads) it became joined with the "thumb" of Paramathma‡ Hence the "Chin-Mudra" mentioned in the Upanishads and used from the Rishis, up to the present day, is a symbol or an expression indicating (1) the state of one's own soul when rid of Karmic, Agnanic affinities, (2) of the occult processes of evolution and involution, (3) of the way how that material world is manifested and maintained, (4) what the ultimate goal of the spiritual minded one and all is, (5) how that is to be reached, (6) how the realisation of that alone gives "eternal youthhood" in the lap of "Moksha" by granting security against birth and death, (7) and how the experience of that "final beatitude" can best be explained but by "Mounam," as it is beyond

* The visible Infinitude is represented by the pointing finger and the invisible Infinitude by the thumb, and the symbol clearly conveys the Pantheistic idea of the non-difference of Jivathma and Paramathma, *i. e.*, their unity when they merge in each other. When encased in Upadhi or ignorance (Avidya), it is known as Jivathma, and when finally extricated from its (ignorance) coils, it is known as Paramathma. The Pantheists make no difference.—P. R. V.

† The Upanishads speak of "Purush" as being "Augushta Mathram," *i. e.*, "like or in shape of "thumb," and hence it (the thumb) symbolises "Purush" or Spirit. The position of the pointing finger is nearest to the thumb, and this shows that Jivathma is always in nearness to Paramathma.—P. R. V.

‡ If both the hands are stretched flat, the pointing finger will be seen to join with the other three fingers, the thumb being apart. In "Chin-Mudra" the pointing finger is separated from the other three fingers and joined with the thumb, and only by this union is gained salvation.....—P. R. V.

mortal experience and representation, agreeably to the lines of Edwin Arnold :

"He is one with Life
Yet lives not. He is blest ceasing to be."

"Om. Amitaya! Measure not with words
Th' Immeasurable; nor sink the string of thought
Into the Fathomless. Who asks doth err,
Who answers, errs. Say nought !"

Again,

"Nor him, nor any light
Shall any gazer see with *mortal eyes*,
Or any searcher know by *mortal mind*."

This was how Lord Siva taught by "Chin-Mudra," and why all real Yogis are represented in that position.

In connection with the elucidation of the philosophic rationale of the symbol under discussion, the philosophy of "Aham" will be discussed. It is a Sanscrit word which means "I" or "the individuality" as opposed to "personality," and how does it mean so? The word is composed of the letters A, Ha, and M. The Sanscrit language is known as the *Bhasha* of the Gods, as it breathes Divine knowledge in every one of its departments, beginning from the alphabet itself. The arrangement and construction of the Sanscrit alphabet are highly occult and metaphysical, and we shall consider that claim in connection with the philosophy of "Aham." All the letters of the Sanscrit alphabet are arranged between A (Akaram) and H (Hakaram). Akaram is the basis or the matrix for the existence and sounding of the other letters, and the sage "Valluvar" says that just as all the letters have *A* for their beginning, so the world has got "Spirit" for its primal cause. A (Akaram), and H (Hakaram) are Purush and Prakrithi respectively in Mantra and Yoga Sastras; as every Brahman knows them to be "Siva" and "Sakthi" beejams (seeds) in all his daily religious observances and rites. The Sanscrit alphabet teaches the occult theory of evolution and involution. Analysis from A (Akaram)—the "mesha" of the zodiac—leads to H (Hakaram), the material of the five elements of "Meenam;" and synthesis upwards leads to that *Akaram*, the *Karana* of all that exists. The arrangement of the alphabet between A and H symbolises that the processes of evolution are graduated between Spirit and Prakrithi, and have begun from the former and ended in the latter. "Aha" in "Aham" is therefore the combination of "Purush" and "Prakrithi" or "Siva" and "Sakthi," or to put it more clearly and precisely "Aham" is evidently "Aum" itself; "ha" and "U" being interchangeable, for the reason that they both mean one and the same thing, being one and the same Sakthi beejam, and hence "ha" in "Aham" is equal to "u" in "Aum."

The true individuality in man is the Athma, which is always represented in Upanishads as the "lamp of" Aum "ever burning in him," and hence it is rightly known as "Aham," which is "Aum" itself.

This, in short, is the philosophy of "Chin-Mudra" and of the Sanscrit Alphabet together with "Aham," and materialists and sceptics and people of the orthodox community will do well to ponder over these things and understand them rightly.

P. R. VENKATARAMA IYER, F. T. S.

MISSIONARY ILLUSIONS.

THE Rev. S. M. Johnson, a Presbyterian clergyman of Denver, Colorado, U. S. A., preached a sermon a couple of months ago in his church in that city upon Heathendom. In the course of his address he spoke of a missionary meeting he had lately attended, and made the following suggestive admission as reported in a Denver paper.

"Of course the object of our gathering was to learn the most recent news from the missionary field. There were present eighty-four workers, representing missionary labors among the Indians and in all the countries of the world. They told us with unanimity that a great reaction is setting in all over the Orient against the religion of the Western world. We have been led to believe that there was a great movement, especially in Japan, toward Christianity. That was true, but now the tide has turned, and from the Mediterranean to Japan a reaction is in progress. They are turning back to their old ways, discarding everything of the Western civilization and taking on their old costumes. Dr. Jessup told us that he can see from his window on the Bosphorus four new mosques lifting their heads toward the heavens. At Tokio they are building the largest university in Japan as a bulwark to Buddhism. The most popular feature of Christian work in the Orient has been the establishment of schools, to which heathen children have flocked. But at the latest we were told that the children are being rapidly withdrawn. I am not despondent, but rejoiced at the work of this reaction."

One might expect that this re-animation of "Heathendom" would cause a feeling of consternation in the missionary camp; but no! this time, at least, the preacher was equal to the occasion, and soothed his congregation by explaining to them its "meaning."

"What does it mean? Just this, that Christianity is making itself felt as hammer, and the old institutions are going up in fire.* The heathen religions are beginning to foresee their fate and are preparing for the death struggle. I am glad that these missionaries went out there with an open Bible in hand and have so deeply touched the masses that the heathen authorities are stirring themselves."

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* Missionaries sometimes "hammer" the heathen a little too vigorously, if the following extract from the *Bombay Gazette* of May 25th be admitted as evidence:—

"There is certainly 'muscular Christianity,' as the Mandalay paper puts it, in Burma. Ministers are either whipping women, or assaulting men, or otherwise doing violence around them. There is a Mr. Nodder who has acted objectionally; then Mr. Stockings; and now there is a Mr. Sutherland. Mr. Sutherland has beaten one Mr. King, whose offence consisted in having employed a woman, a Burmese convert who wanted employment. It is not known why Mr. Sutherland was displeased in this matter, but he trespassed, insulted and assaulted; for which he has been fined fifty rupees. And now the public wish to say what they think about this kind of thing. There is, of course, the effect it must have upon the heathen, and the disrepute into which it is likely to bring Christianity; for still do the heathen look to example rather than to precept, judging of the value of teachings by the conduct of the teachers."

Irritating, the missionaries have long been considered by educated "Heathen," but this makes them out "irritants" in the medical sense :—clerical mustard plasters warranted to stir up a sluggish religious circulation.

A good many freethinking people, both in and out of the T. S., feel anything but overjoyed at this now generally acknowledged revival of antique faiths and re-furbishing of ancient forms and ceremonies. They think it a return to the days of credulity and superstition. The fact, however, seems to be that it is only one of the consequences of that awakening of the thinking faculty which is one of the most remarkable features of our times. To appreciate the scope and true meaning of this awakening, however, one must take a bird's-eye view of the situation, otherwise any person is sure to judge of things according to his prejudices. Incredulity, for example, was never so rampant before, nor materialism gaining ground so fast, according to the lugubrious class of "divines;" never before was Christianity spreading so triumphantly, according to the optimistic school, of which our Denver friend is a striking example.

The fact is that each sees a part of the truth, and paradoxical as it may seem, both are right, as a moment's consideration will show. The dull, material earth-bound, apathetic, thought-forsaken rank and file of the public is just now furnishing both sides with recruits in the shape of people who are beginning for the first time to think of things beyond the limited horizon of their routine lives. According as the philosophic or the religious element prevails in their nature, these sucklings in a higher life betake themselves to the Sunday School or to the Lecture Hall; the consequence being a show of activity in both places, which the proprietors and doorkeepers of each attribute to a diminution of activity in the other. It is curious that the growth of scepticism should be accompanied by a religious revival, but both have a common cause, as we have seen, and they are not inimical in reality. That cause is the religious sentiment that is welling up in many hearts, which, before the awakening in them of thought and reflection, were dry and barren ground, and it is but natural that much of this flow from the newly opened spring should be caught in the ancient vessels which eager and interested hands hold ready to receive it.

The religious sentiment cannot die out of the world, or even be seriously impaired by any possible growth of scepticism, for it is inherent in the hearts of men, and a part of our human nature, and is, therefore, bound to show itself and make itself felt in some form or other; but not necessarily in the same form, and it is a patent fact that the old dogmatic religions are being undermined in all directions, and by a multitude of causes, but chiefly by the altered "standard of probability" which has arisen among men of late years. People now have a different and more exacting idea than their forefathers had of the amount of evidence necessary to justify belief, a change which is but a natural consequence of a wider knowledge of nature, of more accurate logical methods, and of greater mental honesty :—three things which, in turn, are due to modern science, and to the scientific method of fearlessly probing

everything to the bottom, and of listening, or trying to listen, as willingly to the arguments against any opinion or hypothesis as to those in its favor; for on no other condition is the attainment of knowledge in the fields of science possible.

According to the Rev. Mr. Johnson, it is the power of Christianity, or the fear of that power, that has aroused the heathen to religious activity. Observation among the heathen themselves does not bear out this explanation. The heathen do not seem to be very much afraid of the missionaries, who to them represent Christ and the Apostles and the power of Christianity. On the contrary there is a growing appreciation, even a sneaking regard, for the missionary in heathen lands,—at least in India. It is now pretty generally perceived that the missionary has done a great deal for the people in the educational line, and that their little-mindedness renders them harmless as religious antagonists. It is safe to say that if the missionaries packed up tomorrow, and carried themselves and their educational efforts to Africa, there would be a cry of lamentation throughout India, in view of the empty schools and deserted colleges that would then stud the country. So far as one can judge by observation on the spot, the heathen is just as little terrified at the power of Christianity as the Christian pretends to be of the power of any of the heathen religions. The orthodox, pious Hindu and the strict Buddhist are to all appearance frightened by precisely the same things as is the religious Christian. They are all mortally afraid of having their pretensions questioned, their assertions examined, and their assumptions disallowed. No! if it be a fear of Christianity that is exciting Heathendom at present, it is not Christianity *as a religion*, for the heathen are perfectly aware that it is dangerously attacked itself by the prevailing religious dry-rot. It is not the religious element in Christianity that is threatening the venerable faiths of the East, and frightening their adherents, but, if any, the iconoclastic;—the combative, unbelieving, destructive element, which gets in its work, not by demonstrating the truth of Christianity, but by showing up the fallacies and follies of the rival "persuasions" it attacks. The fact is that the missionary in heathen lands is, and must necessarily be, a pioneer of Freethought, and it is an instinctive feeling of that fact, even if it be not intellectually cognized, which gives rise to any fear of the "power of Christianity" that may exist in the minds of religious "heathen."

It would appear, therefore, on thinking the matter over, that our Denver cleric is more right than he might seem at first sight to be, when he uses the somewhat mixed metaphor, that "Christianity is making itself felt as a hammer, and the old institutions are going up in the fire;" but he forgets that Christianity itself is also being pretty badly hammered all the time, and that it too is in considerable danger of "going up in the fire of free criticism."

Indeed, if such an institution existed as an Insurance Company for religions, it is probable that Christianity would have to pay quite as heavy a premium now for a policy as any of its brethren!

The critical and scoffing spirit introduced by the missionaries as a weapon against heathen superstitions is two-edged, and has already cut pretty badly the ecclesiastical fingers that wield it; *vide* the strongly pronounced freethinking tendencies of Hindu youths educated in missionary schools, and what is perhaps more to the point, the religious indifference that reigns in Anglo-Indian society. But the fact is that the religion preached by the missionaries is being disintegrated by a more potent instrumentality than even "a hammer." It is feeling, perhaps, more than any other faith, the effect of the change in men's estimate of what constitutes valid evidence in matters of religion. It has to face all the consequences of the altered "standard of probability,"—a change in men's way of viewing things which is always an irresistible solvent for pre-existing dogmatic religions. So long as men think it probable that the gods would act in a cruel, immoral and irrational manner, they believe upon mere assertion that they do so; but the moment they arrive at a perception of the extreme improbability of the Ruler of the Universe behaving like a shockingly bad man, all the scriptures and all the ecclesiastics in the world would never convince them that such is the case.

ALPHA.

NOTES ON AMITA'BHA'.

TO the Buddhist of the Northern School, AMITABHA—"Immeasurable Light"—the Fourth of the Five Dhyani Buddhas whose Avalókitéswara is Padmapáni, and whose emanation was Gautama Buddha,* occupies the highest and the most important rank in the Divine heirarchy. Esoterically also the Fourth Dhyani Buddha, is the most important, as he is connected with the present Fourth Round, and about which we shall dwell further on. He is himself a manifestation of the "Ádi Buddha," an idea that may be said to correspond with that of Indian Parabrahmam.† Amitábhá, according to the Northern Buddhistic works, presides over the region of Sukhávati or "of infinite happiness," so called, because its inhabitants have no sorrows but enjoy an infinity of bliss. Three classes of persons, whose firm purpose is to be born in the Paradise of Amitábhá, shall be born there. They are: (1) The superior class, consisting of those who, having left their homes and the desires of the flesh, have become disciples, or those who have ever practised the six Paramitas,—such people are born as Bódhisatwas seated on a lotus in the midst of a precious lake in that Paradise. (2) The middle class, consisting of persons who, being unable to become disciples (Shamans), yet have thoroughly devoted themselves to the attainment of religious merit, ever accepting and obeying the words of

* This is the view of the Mahâyâna School.

† According to the Nepaulese Buddhists. This the Chinese Buddhists do not adopt.

Buddha, and practising virtue with determination—these shall be born in that place in a degree of excellence coming after the former. (3) The inferior class, consisting of those unable to prepare every kind of religious merit, who, on some former occasion, have earnestly practised the rules of piety, and on the conclusion of each day recite the name of Buddha; these also towards the end of their life beholding the form of Buddha in their sleep, shall also be born in that land only in an inferior degree of excellence to the former class. That name of Buddha, the last class of men are ordained to recite, is the name of Amitábhá. His attributes are infinite love and compassion for men; he is also eternal, and from him proceeded the merciful Bódhisatwa Kwan yin, the "Voice" or the "Word" that is everywhere diffused.

Among his other names, there is one of Chinese, meaning the original teacher (Upádhyáya). One of the traditions regarding the antecedents of Amita makes him the second son of a Chakravarti (Emperor) of the lunar race, and was, like his father, called Kausika. It was further alleged that he was then converted by a Buddha called Sahésvararája, that he embraced the religious life, made certain vows and was reborn as Buddha, in Sukhávati, where Avalókitéswara and Mahâsthánaprápta joined him.

This is nearly all the information available for us of the most popular Buddha in China. Western Orientalists are unable to find in it "any traces of a Brahminical or Vedic origin of the doctrine;" but the description given of this Buddha by the Northern Buddhists, recalls to the mind of a Hindu, those of the Dévatas in the Swarga, or Brahmalóka, given in the Puránas. The question then arises, 'Can we not find any information about this name in our writings?' The object of this paper is, therefore, to answer that question, from the Hindu point of view; and the supporters of the theory of the Indian origin of the Buddhistic mythology will find much in it to corroborate their conclusions.

We have in the Adyar Library a painting of an eighteen-handed "Amitábhá" from the description given in the Chinese books, which is said to be nearly 800 years old. It was presented to our President Founder by a Japanese priest, and a description of the painting will not fail to be of interest especially to a Hindu.

The painting is on a paper which measures 36 inches by 10, while the painting itself is 28 inches by 8. Surrounding it on all sides is an inscription in Chinese, treating probably of the glories of Amitábhá, who is represented as seated on a lotus flower, which is on an unblown lotus Sukhávati, which is represented by a castle, below which is the ocean with billows raging. The dress of Amitábhá is of "Cáshaya" or ascetic color, usually worn by sanyásis in India and Ceylon. The Ásána or posture is the Swastika, and the Mudras (positions of hands) of the first two hands (from below) of the right side are Chinmudra and Upadésha Mudra respectively, with the first counting the bead of a rosary; while the first hand of the left side has also the same Chinmudra. Three of the 18 hands—nine on each side,—are thus engaged, while the other fifteen contain several weapons in them.

Round his neck is a necklace set with precious stones, with a large one hanging near the centre. On the head there is a crown, and around the head the magnetic aura brilliantly shines.

We shall now explain the symbology of the postures and weapons from a purely Hindu point of view, that is, as a Hindu would explain it by the aid of his occult symbology given in the Puranas, &c., just in the same way as he would do in the case of one of his own deities.

The name itself (Amitábhá) is not foreign to the Hindu writings. From the 1st and 2nd chapters of the third Amsa of Vishnu Purána,* we learn that it is the name of one of the controlling dévatas (who preside over the three regions) during the Manwantara of Raivata, the 5th Manu; also during that of Sávarni, the 8th Manu. This being the Manwantara of Vaivasvata, the 7th on the list, it follows that one Amitábhá (a purely Sanscrit word literally meaning "unmitigated splendour") already reigned over the three regions, and one more of that name has yet to reign in the next Manwantara. It is curious to find both the old commentators on Vishnu Purána, one of whom lived before the 9th century A. C., silently passing over the verses in which this name occurs.

The ocean underneath symbolises the primal (undeveloped) condition of the universe before its evolution. The figure of castle above it is in itself made of three smaller figures, which, though not clear, seem to represent as follows. The lower the five subtle elements, the middle the five gross elements, and the upper the three gunas,—Sátvika, Rájasa, and Támasa. This being nearly the natural process of evolution, must be taken to represent them in the absence of any reliable information on the point. The unblown lotus symbolizes the Avyakta or unmanifested condition of Brahmánda,† as the full blown flower (lotus) above it the manifested condition. I may here remark that, in the Puránas, especially the Vishnu Purána, the world or cosmos is always said to be symbolized by a lotus.

The Ásana is the Swastikásana, and used while one is in Samádhi; it represents Sthirya (steadiness) and Aksharatwa (imperishability). The Káshaya dress (the dress of a sanyasi) denotes purity. The 18 hands represents the 18 hands of either Vishnu or Siva, when the latter symbolyse the several forces of nature. What those forces are cannot be said at present, having with me not even a single Samhita of either Pancharátra or Saiva Ágamas. But any single reader can find them out for himself by a reference to the Kriyá Páda of Nárada, or Vámadéva Samhita of the former set of Ágamas.

Now as regards the hands:

First, the right side.—The first hand with the thumb and middle finger brought together is said to be of Chinmudra, or Gnyána-

* Several other Puránas, such as the Bhágavat, Márkandéya, &c., speak to the same effect.

† The stages of evolution above given are almost identical in point of order with the Visishtádvaita theory of evolution.

mudra, and the circle formed by the joining of these two fingers represents, as is generally known, the Cosmos.

This Chinmudra is to be found only with such great adepts as Náráyana Rishi, Dakshinámúrti, Vasishta, &c.

The second hand is with Upadésa Mudra, and symbolizes the power of initiation. Only great gurus and sanyásis use it, and that during the initiation of their disciples. The third hand is with a sword, which symbolizes Gnyána Sakti, and is one of the five weapons of Vishnu. Why the sword should represent Gnyána Sakti every Theosophist knows. It is by Gnyána that one can cut asunder the Karmapása (lit., the rope of Karma) and become liberated from matter. The fourth contains an Akshamála (rosary of crystals), and its 24 beads represent the 24 Tatwas which are subordinate to Vishnu. These 24 Tatwas are Prakriti (matter), Buddhi (intellect), Ahankára* (egotism), the five subtle elements, the five Gnánéndriyas (organs of perception), the five Karméndriyas (organs of action), Manas (mind), and the five Máhabhútas (gross elements).

The unblown lotus in the 5th represents the unmanifested cosmos, and is also held by Vishnu, Lakshmi, Brahma and Siva, and more especially Lakshmi, the "mother of the universe" and the goddess of wealth. The hatchet in the 6th is the Parasu of Parasuráma, and incarnation of Vishnu, who extirpated the Kshatriyas. Ankusa, a hook used by mahouts to drive the elephants, is in the seventh hand, for driving off, say the Puranas in reference to Vishnu, "the elephants called avarice." In the eighth hand there is Trisúla (trident) representing the three Agnis, viz., Hóma (terrestrial fire), Antariksha (the fire of the central regions—the Astral Fire), and the Vidyut (of the lightning). The three points jutting out of a single one shows that they have all sprung up from one and the same point. This trident is the world-destroying force of Siva. The 9th hand has a rosary of 56 beads, and is called Japamála. It represents the 50 letters of the classical, and 6 more belonging exclusively to the Vedic, Sanskrit alphabet. It may be here said that the Sanskrit alphabet is entirely symbolical, representing the several forces of nature—the manifested Vách. No wonder, then, that the worshippers of Amitábhá should hold the doctrine of the eternity of the "sound" or Vách, and Kwang yin, the Bodhisatwa, a personification of the "sound" should be represented as his son; and well may Dr. Rhys Davids suspect the influence of the Neoplatonists of the school of Ammonius Saccas, over the northern school of Buddhism! He may for the present rest assured that this theory of the Vách is, even according to the Western "Critical" writers on India, as old as Yáska and Pánini.

Secondly. The left side.—The first hand from below counts the number of the sacred mantras, a daily practice in India, great importance being attached to the number of times a mantra should be recited. These numbers are considered very important, viz:—10 28, 56, 108, 504, 1,008, 2,000, 5,000, 7,000, 10,000 and 100,000.

* I may here state that these terms belong to the Visishtadwaitic philosophy, but should not be supposed to have the same connotations and denotations, as those of similar terms in the Sankhya philosophy, nor should the English terms given in brackets convey the same idea as these. They were used for want of better ones.

The efficacy of the mantras being in proportion to the number of times repeated.

The second hand contains a book which, with the Hindus, might mean the Vedas, and will be found held by Vishnu in his Kúrmávatára. If a similar idea prevails among the Northern Buddhists, it probably means the three Pitakas or baskets. The third contains Amrita Kalasa, the vessel of Amrita, which means either immortality, or the sacred nectar, which gives everlasting manhood. It is likely that immortality is here meant, which the Deity is capable of giving. The fourth contains Sankha (conch-shell); the occult symbol of sound (Vách or Sabda), which means that it is either the sustainer of, or the most important thing (?) in, the Cosmos. The fifth contains the Chakra (discus), which has 1,000 facets. It is described in the Agama as of "brilliant splendour and brightness (prabhá), equalling that of a crore of suns, and showing to the Agnánis (ignorant people) the way to attain Vishnu." It is thus a destroyer of Avidya and sin. The sixth hand contains the Pása (rope) by which the Deity ties and unties, as it were, the whole world. The Pása is, of course, the Karmápasa (the rope of Karma described at the end of the "Light on the Path"). The seventh has Kamandalu, a favorite vessel of Vishnu in his Vámana Avátár, and also of several great Rishis, as Dúrvása, Visvámitra, and others. The eighth has a full blown lotus, the signification of which has already been explained. Suffice it to say that the representation of a full-blown lotus being held in his hand is quite consistent with the Buddhist idea of his guarding the whole manifested Cosmos. The ninth having Dhwaja (flag) indicates the absolute sovereignty of the Deity over it. The Jatá (long tresses of hair) is a common thing for Mahádéva or Siva, not to speak of almost all the Rishis and Sadhus that India has produced; as also the third eye possessed also by the great Rishi Bhrigu, which denotes intuition or knowledge. The figure above the head corresponds to Chandra (moon) on the head of Mahádéva, with whom it is a symbol of the sovereignty over the Cosmos. Lastly, the circle around the head is the Kála Chakra (cycle of time) of Vishnu, or may mean the highly spiritual aura (téjas) of any great Being, a Dévata or a man. The necklace round the neck with the gem in the centre is also a jewel of Vishnu. The former denotes the various manifestations of Prakriti, and the latter the pervading nature of the Absolute.

Even the Chinese name which means the "Original teacher" is not new. In the Shiva Puránas Siva is so called, and in the Mahábhárata (Sahasranámádhyáya of Anusásanika Parva), one of the names of Vishnu is "the great physician."

There is an avatar of Vishnu called Nara-Náráyana. Strictly speaking it is not one avatár, but two avatárs, as Nara and Náráyana are two different individuals. The reason for this avatar was, that at one time no real gnánis could be found on earth, and to perpetuate the system of Guru and Chela, Vishnu took a double form, Náráyana being the Guru, and Nara the disciple. Several great secrets are said to have been taught, among which the real of Shatchakra, Sriyantra, and the famous Ashtákshari. These

great Purushas (personages) are now believed to live even now in Badarikásrama, about 70 miles north of Hardwar, and is one of the seven sacred places of the Hindu pilgrimage. This is the information we get from the Puránas. The Ágamás (Páncharátra) do not deny this, but add that the great Vishnu himself revealed several secrets to Nárada, and was thus called the "Original teacher." The Guruparampara (apostolic succession) of the Visishtadvaitees is traced to Vishnu in the same manner as these A'gamas do. A great deal more of the explanation of these symbols can be given from the Indian writings, but I would be then writing a paper on "Oriental Symbolism."

It will be thus seen that of the various weapons, Vishnu has Sankha (conch), Chakra (discus), Parasu (hatchet), Khadga (sword), Padma (lotus), Kalasa (vessel), Kamandulu (also means a vessel), and Dwaja (flag). Lakshmi has only the Lotus and Kalasa (vessel). Buddha as Vishnu has three eyes and Akshmála; Brahma and Saraswati have a book, Siva has Trisúla (trident), the three eyes, and Chandra (moon), on which account he is called Chandra Maulisvara. Káli has Sankha Chakra, Padma, and the sword; while Akshmála is a favorite thing with Hayagriva, Náráyana Rishi, Buddha, and several great Rishis.

The Indian mind sees nothing foreign in the painting. To it everything is Indian, and it may even be the case that the signification of the symbols given by the Chinese are identical with those given in the Indian writings strictly so-called. Or it may be that the symbols are borrowed from a common source. This part of the subject, I must confess, I am not competent to touch; but I shall satisfy myself and the curiosity of those readers who have not had the advantage of studying the other Theosophical writings, by simply condensing all that is given out in them, and leave them to compare for themselves the explanations from the three standpoints of Buddhism, Hinduism, and Occultism.

The Dhyáni Buddhas or Dhyán Chohans are the perfected humanity of previous Manwantaric epochs, and their collective intelligence is described by the name of Ádi Buddha. These Dhyán Chohans or planetary spirits belonging to our planetary chain; and the number of these planetary spirits or perfected human spirits of former world periods is infinite, but only five are practically identified in exoteric, and seven in esoteric teachings.

Every earthly mortal Buddha has his pure and glorious counterpart in the mystic world free from the debasing conditions of this material life: or rather the Buddha under material conditions is only an appearance of the reflection or emanation or type of a Dhyáni Buddha. Of the seven Dhyáni Buddhas, five have hitherto manifested—not four as exoteric teachings have it—and two are to come in the 6th and 7th Root races of this Fourth Round. Amitábhá is a Dhyân Chohan, and is the divine prototype or Dhyáni Buddhá of Gautama Buddha, manifesting through him whenever this great soul incarnates on earth as he (Amitábhá) did in Tzon Khapa.

Madame Blavatsky identifies Kwan yin as the issue of Amitábhá with the Indian "Vách," a synonym for the Verbum or the Word, and can therefore be surely called even, according to the esoteric as well as in the exoteric system, an issue of this Dhyáni Buddha.

Thus, so far as is given out by the occultists the explanation of Amitábhá and his figures from the Indian standpoint, are quite consistent with the occult: and it may even be true that one of the former incarnations of the present Dhyán Chohan Amitábhá was a son of an Indian king of the Lunar race, but converted into a Buddhist by a Buddha.

S. E. GOPALACHARLU, F. T. S.

THE ADYAR LECTURES.

THE Convention Hall at Head-quarters presented a charming appearance on the afternoon of Saturday, the 19th July. Filled with an audience representative of the best intellectual culture of Madras, their picturesque Oriental dress artistically contrasting with the creamy-tinted walls; the marble-floored daïs backed by a green mass of potted shrubs and plants, and framed at the sides by palm-fronds, whose graceful foliage drooped like giant plumes where they touched the ceiling; the Imperial ensign of Japan and the Buddhist Flag crossed overhead in a trophy, and between them suspended a picture in distemper of Saraswati, the Aryan goddess of Wisdom; at the Eastern end, through the open doors of the Library, a vista of marble floor, wood-carvings, and the huge bronze lantern from Kioto, the four walls of the Hall covered with the shield-escutcheons of the Society's world-strewing Branches—it was a scene to remember with pleasure. Mr. Fawcett was giving the opening lecture of his metaphysical course, and, difficult though the subject was, dealing, as it did, with the profoundest philosophical speculations, he was listened to for two hours with unflagging attention. Not a person left the Hall, there was no whispering or uneasiness. The discourse is printed *verbatim* here, and I leave it to our Western readers to say whether it is likely that an average American or British audience would have sat it out so patiently. Its merits as an intellectual effort may be gauged by the speaker's synthesis of the complex doctrines of Kant's philosophy and his analysis of its bases. Without omitting a single essential point, without once becoming involved or unintelligible, Mr. Fawcett has condensed into a few pages the entire Kantian philosophy, and shown himself master of all its details. It was the verdict of the best educated Hindus present that it was the ablest critique upon the origins of modern philosophical thought that they had ever heard or read. I feel very proud to have presided on the occasion and launched our young eaglet from the Theosophical nest.

A peculiar feature of the gathering was the fact that the audience was not one collected by the issue of invitation-cards, but every seat had been applied for by letter in advance, in response to an announcement in the local papers. Among the applicants were professors and assistant-professors in the Madras Colleges, graduates of the University, members of the B. A. and B. L. classes, editors, authors, and some Europeans. Many friends had doubted if, in view of our place being six miles from the heart of the town and no public trams or omnibuses available, there would be a fair audience; but I knew the taste of the Indian public well enough to persist in the scheme, and the result justified my anticipations. Following is the text of the Lecture :—

The Power Behind the Universe.*

LECTURE I.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.

"Whole systems of philosophy have been built upon what is called sensuous experience, and this so-called experience is supposed to be so obvious, so natural, so intelligible, that nothing need be said about it. True philosophy, on the contrary, knows of nothing more difficult, more perplexing, more beyond the reach of all our reasoning powers, than what is called experience."—MAX MULLER.

"As long as the mystic abides by his results, without trying to give them a rational foundation, he is not yet a philosopher."—VON HARTMANN.

SECTION (1.)

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BENEATH the canopy of a starlit sky, where myriad sparkling gems stud the sombre brow of Night, strange reflections are apt to stir the observer—reflections which, sublime as they are, stream into consciousness, tinged with a subdued awe and melancholy. They tell of a Sphynx-like universe, whose riddle has been answered by a seeming history of errors from the era of the archaic caveman down to that of the religionist and philosopher of to-day. And yet it is impossible for the thoughtful temperament to refuse some sort of tentative reply. It is equally impossible to approach the theme devoid of some vague emotional thrill. Contemplation, indeed, of the abyss of star-clusters and nebulæ, all probably mothers of, or pregnant with, human races, moved even the cold intellect of Kant, perforce driven to exclaim "two things fill the mind with awe—the starry heavens above, and the moral sense within me." And when the ranging vision seeks the aid of the telescope, or broods over the romance of descriptive astronomy, fresh vistas of cosmic splendour, fresh enhancements of the great enigma, surge up in the dizzy brain. Turning again from the survey of spatial immensities to pore over the pages of geology, the scholar is still further impressed with the colossal vastness of even planetary Time. Gazing beyond that chronological landmark he is completely lost. Here, in truth, on the altar steps of the sublime, the veriest fool might breathe an atmosphere fit to give him pause. And, indeed, how potent are the majestic sciences of astronomy and geology to quicken the normal indifferentist, all experience goes to show. Rich with lofty associations, they carry with them a fascination not easily to be avoided or dispelled. What shape the attendant meditations may take will, of course, be determined by the stage of culture characteristic of the epoch of inquiry. Nature, whose mystery could once fire the Vedic Rishis with the 'divine frenzy' of religion, and nerve

reformers to light the torches of theology throughout the world, is an examiner with pupils of varying capacity. Hence the variation in the replies as the ages roll on their course. Just now things are prophetic of great changes. There are many indications that for the advanced nations the day of theology is going, never perhaps to return, and for my part I hail that promise with gladness. But over and above this transition loom the greater problems of life, ever more prominent and impressive. Oblivious to worship of unknown agencies, we are becoming vividly alive to the need of fathoming our own status in the order of cosmic events. Consider, indeed, for a moment one prevalent type of reflection which follows in the wake of increased physical knowledge. It is an ever-recurring question, whether admitting of an approximate solution or not—With what design or meaning is fraught the evolution of man (and animal) out of the womb of cosmic stuff; of what metaphysical significance is the unit thus awaking to being, often as not to serve as the sport and victim of the forces of its environment? The "Whence," "How," and "Whither" of the individual man, these, then, are the three central issues propounded for treatment. As organism he is, in truth, a *quantité négligeable* in the macrocosm. A minute unstable form on the surface of a huge planet, itself, again, less than a sand-grain on the bed of an illimitable ocean, it is only for a moment that he dances in the sunlight of life. As an intellectual and emotional creature, on the other hand, he has slowly learned to pride himself on the possession of a less disputably important standing in the universe. He is inclined to rate individual consciousness as superior in 'dignity' to the most stupendous manifestations of the distribution of matter and motion characteristic of the so-called external world. What, however, of this boasted 'dignity' and status outside the narrow little sphere of human pride and human fancies? The sentiment is itself a bye-product of mental evolution, so many able thinkers assert. Here then comes the rub. Whether the said 'consciousness' can be affirmed to survive its physical basis; what are its relations, if any, with the drift of a possible cosmic scheme; what, in short, is its origin, development and ultimate destiny—these and many kindred issues constitute the riddles of modern thought. It is not, of course, to science that we look for the complete solution of these highly abstract problems, assuming for the moment that any such solution is possible. That 'star-eyed' Goddess would stray from her rightful domain, were she to attempt to do more than generalise the co-existences, successions, and resemblances which obtain among phenomena, in the domain of 'that which doth appear.' So far as the assistance of positive psychology, of biology, and other departments of ordinary scientific inquiry may be necessary to establish or consolidate a groundwork, so far our indebtedness in that quarter will be enormous. But there it must needs rest. In the establishment of all that transcends phenomena, in the progress from the facts of terrestrial experience to the possibilities and reality beyond that experience, the field is reserved for the mystic and metaphysician. Their methods may either be speculative, pure and simple, an extension of normal inductive inquiry, or a working combination of the two. The feasibility of this leap from the experienced Known to the dark Unknown is, I need hardly remark, practically denied to us by the systematic Agnosticism of today. It will, consequently, be one of the main features of these lectures to demonstrate on what lines the aforesaid leap is practicable.

SOURCES OF BIAS IN PHILOSOPHY.

On the importance of ascertaining all we can concerning the world-purpose, of seizing and exploiting every promising clue to the approximate unravelling of this sublime riddle, I need not lay stress. It is acknowledged by every thoughtful man, scientist, philosopher, poet and religionist alike. Obviously, however, between the wish for, and the accessibility of, such knowledge a great gulf is fixed. Very warily indeed must this gulf be spanned, and he who hopes to bridge its extent with assumptions will assuredly court failure. All covert begging of issues under the guise of smuggled-in "First Principles" or "intellectual intuitions," must be rigidly and consistently disallowed. Such underpropping of speculation is not only utterly foreign to the epoch of inductive research in which we live, but powerless from its very nature to resist the feeblest onslaught. Emotions also, those great disturbers of judicial thought, must simply go by the board, so far as the conduct of this special line of investigation is concerned. It needs no elaborate essay to indicate how fertile a source of delusion reliance on the guarantee of sentiment proves. The past is strewed with the debris of beliefs so assured. The present is also begetting its crop of notions and principles justified as 'intuitions,' but representing for the most part the natural tendency of all beings to secure the utmost possible pleasure for themselves, whether in the domain of intellectual satisfaction or otherwise. When to the bias due to the feelings is added that of educational and hereditary influences, the maxim '*Magna est veritas et prævalebit*' is apt to totter. Professor Bain has also shown that hasty and erroneous generalisation often springs from the natural "over-vaulting" tendencies of the human mind, as faulty an instrument in its incipient or even later unrevised stages as evolutionist psychology would lead us to expect. "That 'we should make our thoughts the measure of things,' which is done in so many celebrated speculations, is the result of the inherent pushing activity of the system, the determination to proceed on a course once entered on until a check is met with, and even in spite of a good many checks."* Mr. Francis Galton, F. R. S., has, also, in his singularly fresh manner, exposed how ill adapted is the intellect by its very constitution for forming "general

* Logic. "Induction," p. 378.

ideas."* How necessary, therefore, is caution in trusting our own conclusions or in weighing those of others. Errors due to acquired trains of thought or impulse to hasty generalization must be carefully provided against. If, again, the sources of intellectual truth are to be maintained approximately pure, sentiment must only be retained to deck the *results* of inquiry. In establishing, therefore, my several positions, I shall regard the emotional element of the human mind as a worthless interloper in the pursuit of truth. Worthless in the sense of a sustainer of effort it certainly cannot be termed, worthless and highly detrimental to accuracy in the formulation of abstract conceptions and generalisations it too often undoubtedly is.

Credentials of the "Intuitive" Method of Research.

Touching alleged intuitions, superior to both intellectual and emotional springs alike, we have, it is true, heard much of late years. But glance at the conflicting doctrines of the 'illuminati' of the past and present, at the outcome, for instance, of the excessive subjectivity, as Whitney terms it, of the Hindu mind. Mingled with many gems of thought is much of a worthless character. Even the authors and disciples of the six Darsanas wage fierce war. Kapila accuses the Vedantists of 'babbling like children or madmen,' the brilliant Sankara denounces a follower of Mimansa as a bullock without horns or tail, while the Mimansa stigmatises the Vedantists as Buddhists in disguise. This conflict disproves the finality of alleged intuitive philosophies, necessarily in conflict, because they are deduced from logically unproven principles. Turning again to the system of "Platonic ideas," scented by the favoured philosopher, to the neo-platonic ecstasis, the innate ideas of Cudworth or Descartes, the mysticism of More, Jacobi, and the rest, the "practical necessity" of Kant, the intellectual intuition of Schelling, the theories of Schopenhauer, the faith of Hamilton, and the "spiritual certainties" of religionists of utterly opposed creeds, we find that the various deliverances of knowledge 'superior to, and independent of,' experience are mutually incompatible. They simply exclude each other from being true, and are often, when provisionally popular, subsequently recognised as fallacious. Now-a-days as ever, moreover, it is strange to note that intuitions are always like windfalls at a pinch to the embarrassed mystic or system-builder. The wish seems to stand forth prominently as the father to the thought, especially in the case of that large half-cultured reading public now rampant. What valid 'intuitions' are, supposing they exist, we shall inquire hereafter. It is obvious, however, that mere subjective convictions cannot stand as the basis of a philosophy.

What is Perception or Experience?

I have already implied that the deductive utilisation of assumptions without verification is a self-destructive device for metaphysical thinking.

* "XIXth" Century, July 1879.

But it is equally certain that even this latter type of research must start from something, that inference must rest on some admitted premises. The consideration of this point brings us to the preliminary survey of that great question "What is Experience?"—a question at the bottom of every system alike, from the subjective idealism of a Hume to the blunt materialistic realism of a Büchner. First and foremost of the vexed problems of philosophy, it is perhaps the one most frequently ignored by the superficial thinker. This assertion will sound doubly strange when it is added that its solution one way or the other carries with it the determination of all the leading controversies of metaphysic. In Von Hartmann's language, "The conditions of knowledge constitute its metaphysic." Clearly, therefore, unless some attempt is made to open up this matter at the very outset of a would-be philosophic work, the too audacious writer will but flounder throughout in a morass of ignorant assumption.

You will, however, not unnaturally remark that some of the most prominent thinkers of our time have been content to ignore this matter completely. The case of the materialist wing of Modern Science is in point. Representatives of this school of thought are for ever mentally reconstructing the world-order on the sole basis of what they are pleased to term 'sensuous experience; inferring from the known co-existences and sequences among phenomena to what they hold to be their mechanical antecedents, æons back in the night of cosmic time. Arguing on these lines, they have formulated the uncompromising theory that the Ultimate Reality of things may be interpreted as eternal redistributing of Matter and Force, or matter and motion in space. Observe now with what confidence the abstract data of sensuous experience—"matter," "time," "space," "motion," &c., are accepted as concrete realities without the pale of consciousness. Is, then, the ground for this outspoken faith in an Independent External World, in the reality of *known* things when *not known*, so sure? In no sense. It is too often a dogmatic and flagrant assumption. According, indeed, to Professor Bain and a galaxy of acute thinkers, it involves a contradiction in terms. Max Müller's remark, which I quoted at the outset of this lecture, will here once more appeal to you. In view of these considerations, it is an unwarrantable practice to speak of "Experience," *i. e.*, our knowledge of objects, either as a simple fact, or a fact necessarily independent of ourselves. How great is our debt to German thinkers for throwing these two latter issues into relief we shall see later on. Suffice it now to say that the signal part played by Kant in revolutionizing European philosophy consisted in his improved restatement and treatment of the Platonic and Aristotelian thesis. What are the conditions of experience or knowledge of objects? On this peg hang all the problems hinging on the existence or non-existence of an independent external world, and the possibility of attaining to objective truth, problems which exhaust the scope of

the highest metaphysical speculation. Only thus can any system of realities outside our relative thinking be established. It would, of course, be premature to assume at this stage of our inquiry that any such realities exist. It may, for instance, be argued with great show of logical weight and acumen, that all facts are reducible to processes of thought, volitions and feelings, one form, of course, of the idealist contention. Considerations, such as this, necessitate a strict regard to proof all along the line. And to this policy of proving all propositions, before utilising them as majors for subsequent trains of reasoning, it will be my aim unswervingly to adhere.

Our Basic Postulate.

The sole proposition on which I shall base the fabric of constructive thought is in no sense an assumption, but the barest assertion of *immediate reality* possible. Briefly put, it is to the effect that mental states exist.* I would not venture so far as to posit with the author of the "Science of Knowledge," that all we are *immediately* conscious of are the states and processes of our own *thinking self*. Whether, as Fichte held, there is an Ego or Self distinct from states of consciousness, is a separate and very distinct issue, on which the greatest diversity of opinion prevails among competent thinkers. For a similar reason, the ambiguous and pseudo-syllogistic maxim of Descartes, "Cogito; ergo sum," must be dispensed with. But as to the reality of sensations, judgments, emotions, as such, there can exist no question. To doubt, indeed, the empirical reality of the streams of feeling which make up consciousness would itself constitute a stream of feeling. Hence it is that even sceptics of the type of Hume, a man ever alive to the piquancy of a good scenic effect in philosophy, have never disputed this reality. So far then, at least, we are on firm ground. In proceeding, however, to determine the constitution of these feelings—how they originate, what are their conditions, what their metaphysical interpretation—we take the plunge into the treacherous ocean of inference. Milton's controversial demons in Hell, who found themselves "in wandering mazes lost," could not by any possibility have entangled themselves in more conflicting theories than the numberless human philosophers who have grappled with this colossal problem. If we are in a better position to answer it today, it is only because the labours of the great intellects of the past, the Sankaras, the Vyasas, the Platos, the Aristotles, the Bacons, the Kants, the Hegels, Mills and Spencers have upreared a scaffolding which, however rickety in parts, enables us moderns to obtain a distinctly commanding outlook over the boundless landscape of thought. So dense, however, are the mists which still curl along the hedge-rows of this charming prospect,

* Professor Bain rejects propositions asserting mere Existence, resolving them into predications of co-existence or succession. He does so on the strength of the Law of Relativity flowing from Hobbe's dictum that consciousness involves contrast. For a complete answer to his objection the reader should consult Mill's Note, "Logic" (Eighth Edit.) "Import of Propositions," p. 65.

so feeble our individual vision, that it is hopeless to dream of seizing the picture in its fulness once and for all. Rather must it be pieced together in bits by the joint observation of all those who have first earned the right to survey by clambering up the poles of the time-worn scaffolding. And it will be conducive to the sustained enjoyment of the advantages of that "proud eminence," if those who mount the poles busy themselves with a vigorous attempt to steady and repair the supports as they ascend.

Now in the course of these lectures I am anxious to cast my eye as closely as possible over the stays and props of this great scaffolding known as the History of Philosophy. I propose, also, to add, if practicable, various new additions to the structure when once the underlying supports are recognized as adequate to sustain the strain. Whether these structural innovations will prove of a useful character it will, of course, be for others to judge. At any rate no possible harm can result from making the attempt, as the lashings and stays will be merely of a tentative and provisional nature. Finding, then, that our inherited scaffolding is firmly fixed in the bedrock of fact—in plain language, that no thinker disputes the truth of the really empty proposition "*Mental states exist*"—let us commence by a rapid survey of the foundation props and superstructure. To effect this result, I now propose to examine the systems of the great European thinkers from Kant to Herbert Spencer, as succinctly and briefly as the case admits of. Subsequently to this saturation of our minds, with the diverse aspects of the problem of Experience, it will be possible to pass on to the constructive portion of our researches with a full sense of the actual difficulties involved. Only by dint of this gradual unravelling of the subject can anything approximating to an impartial and comprehensive system be elicited.

SECTION (2).

Modern Philosophy from Kant to Herbert Spencer.

We have now got so far as to recognize inquiry into the conditions of our knowledge of objects as the basic problem of Philosophy. Realising the absurdity of dogmatizing as to possible realities *beyond experience*, previous to determining the conditions and constitution of that same experience, we are content to start and work upward from the very simple formula: 'Mental states exist.' Under 'mental states' are, to employ a convenient phrase, comprised modifications of the Object as well as the Subject side of consciousness—percepts of extended bodies, sounds, tacts, odours, resistances, &c., &c., as well as the passive feelings of

pleasure and pain, the memory trains, imagination, reasoning, and volitions which constitute our subjective life properly so-called. What is popularly known as the perception of matter must be at least provisionally regarded as merely a fact for consciousness. Now, as every tyro in metaphysics is aware, the ordinary man in the street is not disposed to limit himself to the assertion that he has such an OBJECT consciousness; he never hesitates to affirm further that the "world of matter," so-called, *constituting that object consciousness* either is or represents a reality independent of himself. Inability to sense the huge difficulty involved is symptomatic of his stage of culture. The impugner of the objective factness of tree, star, sun and the rest of space-hung existences is to him a hunter of shadows. Nevertheless, the import of the inquiry needs no advocate among serious thinkers, whose tendency to generalize is always chastened by education and personal training. All possibilities of attaining to objective truth hinge on the particular answer to this riddle to that research may compel us to return. It is not so serious a matter to sketch the organization of reason, memory or imagination, out of our primary perceptions. Intellect, popularly so-called, is but the re-shuffling of the elements of perceptive experience, and it is this experience which offers us the grand problem. The conditions of its realization are the core of metaphysics. Atheism, Theism, Pantheism, Agnosticism, &c., all the deeper inquiries relating to the status of the Ego in the world-plan—if plan there be,—all controversies touching cosmology, hinge on their accurate determination. Since the day of Plato, whose insistence on the implications of the two problems of Knowing and Being marked a new epoch, this inquiry has been incumbent on all really comprehensive systems of philosophy. Let us, therefore, now proceed to see what the leading thinkers of the later 18th and 19th centuries have done towards contributing to its unravelling.

WHY WE START FROM KANT.

Perhaps my selection of Kant as the starting point in this necessarily terse survey may appear somewhat arbitrary. What goes under the name of "Modern Philosophy" includes names of very considerable moment anterior in date to the celebrated Konigsberg metaphysician. Among such, for instance, were Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Justification for this step must be sought for in the particular character of the analysis I have in view. For the purposes of a comprehensive glance into the problem of the *origin of knowledge of objects*, the Kantian and post-Kantian developments are admirably suitable. Although, however, it will be unnecessary to gorge you with a surfeit of superfluous systems, it will at the same time be highly conducive to lucidity if a rapid general summary of the lead-up to Kantian speculations is presented. This summary I will now endeavour to give.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY PRIOR TO KANT.

For many centuries previous to the Renaissance, Philosophy or rather its paltry mediæval surrogate, generally known as Scholasticism (early and later), served as the mere handmaid of theology. During that dark epoch the Church was able to adduce arguments which, if not exactly logical, possessed a quite unique cogency. Hence the almost universal subservience to that veteran beguiler of mankind. Independent thinkers, moreover, were not only extremely rare, but crippled by lack of scientific data, and misled by an altogether vicious and reprehensible method of inquiry, which sought to evolve truth from a mere subjective working up of old notions and principles. The interminable squabbles between the Nominalists and the Realists furnished the main theme for ingenuity. Barren, however, as was the labour of the schoolmen in point of actual discovery, it had the merit of initiating an era of precision and distinctness in terminology which has since served us in good stead. In other respects it represents a debauch of the human intellect through generations. Such then was the aspect of the main stream of mediæval speculation in Europe. But clearly this orgie of word-weaving could not permanently obtain, and finally with the reformation of religion a re-action against the distorted Aristotelianism of the schoolmen began to set in with vehemence.* Once, indeed, that the movement had taken root, the sunset of the rule of Anselm, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Ockham, and the rest speedily commenced to tinge the horizon of the ocean of thought. And as it cast its dying glow on the waters a new and fresh movement, the philosophy of the Renaissance, —that of the revivers of the old classical systems, such as the noble-hearted Giordano Bruno, together with the upcropping of the mystico-physical doctrines of Paracelsus, Agrippa Von Nettesheim and others—came into being. From this last phase of the mediæval shapings of knowledge, we pass on to the epoch of Modern Philosophy proper. It is only from this period that any real general independence of thinking becomes discernible. And gradual as is the progress of enfranchisement at first, it is sufficiently real to indicate the importance of the XVIIth century as a landmark in the evolution of the Western wind.

SCHOOLS SPRINGING FROM DESCARTES AND BACON.

The diverse schools of thought which make up the philosophic history of this and the succeeding century are all developments of two foundation texts or rather representative methods of research—the one typified in the dogmatic ontology of the Frenchman Descartes, the other in the empiricist or inductive utilitarianism of Bacon. From the Cartesian assertion of the validity of the "clear and distinct idea" or conception

* "It is chiefly to the great reformation of religion that we owe the great reformation of philosophy. The alliance between the schools and the Vatican had for ages been so close that those who threw off the dominion of the Vatican could not continue to recognize the authority of the schools."—(*Lord Macaulay*).

outside experience, sprang the efforts of the Spinozists, Leibnitzians, Wolffians and others to lay bare the core of existence. The cautious Baconian method evolved such diverging groups as Hobbists, Lockeians, Berkeleyans, the followers of Hume, of Diderot, d'Holbach and the Scotch psychologists Reid, Brown and their successors. In its complete form, as perfected by Herschel, Whewell, Bain, and Mill, it constitutes the implement of modern science. Systematic induction founded on observation and experiment—on patient collation of facts and their groupings according to ascertained agreements—is the key-note of this method. I say 'systematic,' because an absurd impression still seems to prevail in some quarters to the effect that Bacon "invented Induction." Needless almost to remark that the form of Induction *per simplicem enumerationem* is freely discussed by Aristotle and the schoolmen. The absurdity runs deeper than this. It really in sober truth appears, as if many persons resemble that M. Jourdain who talked prose so long without knowing it. The veriest child makes inductions as soon as language invests it with the capacity of framing general propositions and so of supplementing that simpler process of non-verbal direct inference from particulars to particulars common to both man and animal alike. What Bacon really did was to clear speculation of its surviving scholastic dross by limiting all valid accessions of general knowledge to inductions drawn from experience—thus destroying at one blow the sanction of whole systems of baseless word-weaving. 'Axiomata generalissima,' universal assertions, made without evidential warrant, were his 'bête noire.' "Man, the servant and interpreter of Nature,"so he pens the first aphorism of his "Novum Organum," "can do and understand as much as he has observed concerning the order of nature in outward things or in the mind; more he can neither know or do." The bearing of this on psychology and philosophy was at first only indirect, but the clue once given, numerous writers were speedily prepared to follow it consistently up. It deserves mention, by the way, that the celebrated Roger Bacon practically anticipated Lord Bacon in the 13th century, teaching that experience was the fundamental bedrock of knowledge. He lacked, however, the expository power and *seasonableness*—if I may so term it—of his namesake. As to the utilitarian character of Lord Bacon's propaganda, we have his explicit statement that the "New Instrument" had for its central aim *efficaciter operari ad sublevandi vitæ humanæ incommoda**—it was of an essentially practical character. Its advocate, however, objective as was his own bias of thinking, little anticipated the startling developments of doctrine which were to trace their ancestry to his Empiricism or Experientalism. It was enough for him to silence the scribblers who sought to "anticipate Nature" by reference to the inner light of the mind. It was for others to exploit his method in the direction of idealist, sceptic and materialist negations. It was again for a profounder thinker

* "De Augmentis," Book 2, Chap. 2.

than any of these to place Experientialism on trial by putting the revolutionary query—What is the constitution of this much talked-of "Experience" itself? How does our empirical consciousness of objects come to exist?

Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibnitz.

Descartes (1596—1650) starting from his already noted formula 'Cogito, ergo sum,'* and positing the clearness of a conception as the test of its objective truth beyond experience—a truly enormous assumption—opened the campaign of the new dogmatic philosophy. The validity of the idea of a Personal God had, in the first place, to be established. This result he sought to attain by showing that the notion of an Infinite as opposed to that of an Indefinite Being, could not be derived from contemplation of the finite self or of finite objects in space and time. It was, he argued, co-eval with self-consciousness itself and was implanted in us originally by its Prototype—the Infinite Being himself. In addition to this plea, his ontological argument went to show that the idea of the *necessary* existence of God is involved in the conception of the Infinite itself, just as the attribute of possessing three angles is necessarily bound up with our idea of a triangle. On the further assumption of the moral perfection of this Infinite Being, the seeming testimony of consciousness to the reality of an independent external world is accepted as valid. Could God deceive us with an illusion?† Similarly, on the reliability of Deity reposes his thoroughgoing dualism of Mind and Matter, which he regarded as created and contrasted substances, supporting respectively 'the attributa' of Thought and Extension. All this and much more foreign to our immediate purpose may sound loose, inaccurate, and dogmatic. For these drawbacks it has, indeed, received much severe handling. Nevertheless, after making all due discounts, the honourable position of Descartes, as the pioneer of modern philosophy, has never been contested.

Malebranche (1638—1715) next in the line of the dogmatists, is chiefly known for his contribution to the subject of dualism. How to bridge the chasm between the entities, Mind and Matter, was to him the great problem. The *deus ex machinâ* for the puzzle he found in the "Divine Substance," which was equally the basis of both. He regarded our consciousness, whether of subject or object, as a finite portion of the God-consciousness. Spinoza (1632—1677) carried this contention on to its legitimate goal in a so-called Pantheism. This fearless thinker was content to posit one Substance or Reality, whence all things emerge by the

* The form of this statement considered as an abbreviated syllogism (Enthymeme) veils a palpable *petitio principii*, or begging of the conclusion in the major premise. Such, indeed, was the contention of Gassendi. All, however, which Descartes sought to convey was the fact that mind knows its own existence immediately in mental phenomena.

† It is noteworthy, by the way, that Descartes elsewhere resolves all qualities of matter save extension into states or feelings of the percipient. What would the ordinary man say as to this pronounced case of illusion?

same necessity as attaches to the bare fact of its existence. The manifested world of ideas and objects is constituted of modes of two attributes of this One Reality—Thought and Extension. "Individual things are nothing but the modifications of the attributes of God," *i. e.*, the Unica Substantia, as opposed to any personal creator. Deity is neither a spiritual nor physical existence but the Absolute Substance. The world, as given in consciousness, duplicates under another phase the extended world as existing beyond consciousness. "Substance thinking and substance extended are only one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute and now through the other." Such then are the general principles of Spinozism, still so popular and serving as inspiration to more than one modern system. No attempt, of course, is made to seize upon the deeper problems subsequently suggested by the analysis of knowledge, but the drift of the celebrated Jew's thought is always eminently refreshing and suggestive. Compared with the servility of Descartes to theology, it is, indeed, a notable advance in attitude as well as in matter. Leibnitz again (1646—1716) is the antithesis of Spinoza—his infinity of simple substances or "monads" being sharply contrasted with the Absolute Unity of things taught by the latter. His God is the supreme monad which has radiated the myriad subordinate monads. The monads themselves, which take the place in his system of the common physical atomism, have no size, parts, figure, &c., though they possess distinctive attributes of a purely subjective character. They are only changed from within themselves, and are each a "living and perpetual mirror of the universe," containing infinity of being in itself. Extension he regards as an illusion. Always a stickler for theology, he contends vigorously for an optimistic and teleological interpretation of the universe—one of his principal assumptions, the "principle of sufficient reason," requiring for every event or state "a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise." Leibnitz is also an intuitionist of the school which accredits certain 'primitive concepts' of the mind, such as Causality and Substance, with an inherent necessity. He accepts the Cartesian test of truth, with, however, an important reservation to the effect that the clear conception is, strictly speaking, unattainable. All external perception is, in fact, "confused," as witness the illusion of extension veiling mere unextended immaterial monads! For the exposition of his gradation of simple substances from the unconscious (or better *sub*-conscious) to the fully conscious monad, I must refer you to his "Monadology," or any reliable History of Philosophy. His theory of the pre-established harmony of mental and cerebral processes we shall have to examine at a later stage. Brilliant though his system appears, it is open to damaging criticism when proffered as an explanation of the universe. The inherent vice of all dogmatic philosophy, lack of an impregnable basis for assertion, stands plainly revealed. Hence the manifold contradictions discoverable in his thinking.

Passing over the treatises of Wolff, Baumgarten and Crusuis, let us glance over the post-Baconian empiricist developments in England and the Continent.

Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume.

The inductive method of Bacon as exploited by Hobbes (1588—1679) had resulted in the inauguration of English sensationalist psychology. Experience of objects is made the foundation of knowledge. All mental phenomena are shown to originate in feeling, and the exposition of how they do so is so persistently kept up as to practically dethrone philosophy in favour of psychology. Independent external bodies are assumed at the outset, and all matter accredited with the potentiality of sensation. Hobbes was a stout Nominalist regarding all "general" ideas, as no more than terms or word-signs evoking images of certain particular or individual objects. A logician and psychologist of marvellous acuteness and insight, he cleared away a mass of confused contemporary thinking. Locke (1632—1704), a votary of conceptualism, follows with a systematic assault on the theory of "innate ideas," and for him also the great problem is the psychological reduction of the origin of all knowledge to experience. '*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu fuerit*' is a later scholastic maxim fully expressive of the burden of his teachings. He fully admits the reality of matter in the sense of a substrate of the qualities of objects. By the celebrated Berkeley again (1685—1753) we have empiricism pushed in the direction of idealism—the denial of the independent reality of objects. Berkeley, a logical and brilliant nominalist, protested against the self-contradictory affirmation of the world of perceptive experience as existing beyond and independently of that experience. Brushing unceremoniously aside the Lockeian distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, he resolves all so-called physical existences alike into mere states of consciousness of the 'percipient' Egos. The reality, therefore, of objects was for him the fact of their being perceived. It must not, however, be thought that Berkeley was a subjective idealist pure and simple. He did not in any sense regard the so-called external world as an aggregate of modifications of his own mind—*and nothing more.* On the contrary, his view was that objects were *subjectively* present in the divine mind from which they streamed into the arena of our consciousness, and so possessed a standing in a sense independent of human or animal percipients. Inferior in subtlety and depth to the later German metaphysicians Berkeley unquestionably was. But of his work, as a whole, it suffices to say that his main position has as yet resisted all onslaughts. "All the ingenuity of a century and a half," writes Professor Bain, "has failed to see a way out of the contradictions exposed by Berkeley."* The distinction between the empirical idealism of Berkeley and the far subtler systems of the Germans is, however, most important to note. The standpoints are popularly confused.

* "Mental and Moral Science," p. 205.

Hume (1711—1776) not content with this resolution of all material reality into states of 'percipient' minds, proceeded further to deny the existence of the Ego as distinct from mental phenomena. There was no more warrant, he argued, for postulating a substrate for mind than there was for postulating a substrate for matter—all reality was perception, idea and feeling. Personality was nothing, save the succession of states of consciousness, decomposable in his phraseology into the lively "impressions" or feelings, and less lively "*ideas*" or *thoughts*, taking their rise in those former. The concept of causality he held to be an outcome of association with no ground in reality. Thus far the phenomenalism of Hume, which-obviously implied a theoretical scepticism or despair of the possibility of erecting any assured common standard of Truth. Against the views of this thinker and Berkeley, Reid, the founder of Scotch psychology, waged a fierce polemic; his attempts, however, are of a too declamatory character to delay us.

Outcome of Empiricism in France.

Meanwhile in France the empiricist movement had taken a very decided turn. The sensationalist psychology of Locke and Hobbes had served to inspire the advanced opinions of Condillac (1715—1780), the basis of whose system, certain spiritualist concessions apart, was, the formula '*Penser c'est sentir.*' This line of thought found a still more radical expression in the writings of Helvetius (1715—1771), in Lamettrie (1709—1751), in the mastermind of the materialist Diderot (1713—1784), and in the extreme negationism of Baron d'Holbach's famous "Système de la Nature." The outcome, in fact, at this stage of the empiricist agitation in France was the establishment of a great materialist school which reduced consciousness to brain-function, and the ultimate reality of things to physical matter in motion. The nerveless deism of Voltaire and Rousseau now went by the board, and a swarm of minor writers arose to spread far and wide the new mechanical philosophy.

The Situation as presented to Kant.

To sum up, then, the results of pre-Kantian thought—we have seen the dogmatic school positing the validity of the clear idea or conception outside experience, and uprearing on this assumption more or less unstable systems. We have, on the other hand, been confronted with the triple outcome of Empiricism in the directions of idealism, pure phenomenalism, and lastly a mechanical materialism. With these outgrowths the sensation psychology is in almost all cases unreservedly bound up. It will be noted also that each of the three developments takes over "experience," *i. e.*, the object world as given in consciousness, with no suspicion of the need for a really exhaustive analysis. The standpoints of Berkeley and Hume may appear to fulfill this latter requirement, but they do so only in the most tentative and imperfect degree. Hume gets no farther forward than a phenomenalism which converts the distinctions of "mind" and "world" into feelings varying in nothing but degree of vividness and (partly) in mode of grouping. 'Self' and 'not self' are not explained, but become scarcely distinguishable components of an unreal dream. Berkeley, again, takes over objects as a ready made panorama in the Divine Mind; starts with concrete personalities, and relates these to the independent Divine Mind in question. However, we shall revert to these points once more when dealing with Fichte.

It is at this stage in our inquiry that the significance of the great Kantian and post-Kantian movement discloses itself. Taking its rise in the pioneer attempt of the philosopher of Königsberg to unravel the conditions of knowledge, it eventuates in the hands of Fichte and Hegel in subtle forms of idealism of a highly original type. To the review of this situation and to the survey of the chief landmarks of subsequent philosophic history we may now conveniently proceed.

His Critique of Pure Reason.

The message of the "Critique of Pure Reason" must, like that of all great works of its kind, be interpreted in due connection with its epoch. Kant had found himself equally ill at ease with the dogmatism of the Leibnitz-Wolffian schools which tacitly assumed the mind's competency to pronounce on objective truth and the empiricist scepticism of Hume tending so to belittle the value of human thought. It is interesting to note that Kant was originally driven into his line of thought by reflection on Hume's doctrine of Causality. Hume had endeavoured to show that this notion was not given as such in experience, but grew up as an abstraction from observed uniformities of succession. It was thus the outcome of association. Kant, acquiescing in the view of its purely subjective origin, transformed it subsequently into a Category or "pure concept"—one of the *a priori* conditions of experience. Animated, in consequence, by a desire to mediate between Hume and the dogmatists, he penned his famous book designed to constitute "A Critical Inquiry into the foundations and limits of the Mind's Faculty of Knowledge"—a book which, in John Stuart Mill's words, 'will long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation.' The enthusiasm with which it was received almost beggars description. Königsberg became the cynosure of European thought, while in ten years some 300 attacks and defences of the 'Critique' issued from the press. Almost every sphere of inquiry was affected by the new teaching which, within a comparatively short space of time, won the allegiance of almost every philosophical chair in Germany. It crushed current phenomenalism and ontology alike.

Addressing myself to an audience such as this, I do not consider it expedient to break the thread of thought by digressions of a minor explanatory nature. It is clear, for instance, that a comprehension of Kant pre-supposes an acquaintance with what is meant by the doctrine of the

"Relativity of Human Knowledge." Excluding the psychological fact so described, that objects are known only in contrast with one another, its several phases may be summarized as follows. *Knowledge of the world of objects experienced in space and time is in slight, large, dominant or complete degree, relative to the knowing mind or Ego.* A further application relates to the unknowability of the Ego where admitted. There is an admirably lucid chapter on this head in Mill's "Examination of Hamilton," to which work I must refer the still perplexed hearer for further elucidation of the topic.

The Constitution of Experience.

In proceeding to analyze the constitution of experience, Kant starts with the innocent looking query—How are synthetic propositions *a priori* possible? The purport of this question is, however, not far to seek. A synthetic, as opposed to an analytic, essential or identical proposition, asserts an attribute of its subject not comprised in the conception of that subject. Now all analytic propositions are both universal and necessary, resting as they do on the so-called law of contradiction, A is not non-A. Their negation is impossible. 'Man is rational' would be a case in point, if 'rationality' is included in the connotation of the concept or classname 'Man.' They are also *a priori* as independent of any particular experience; the concept once formed being explicable in the form of a judgment at will. Most synthetic propositions, on the other hand, are *a posteriori*, that is to say, are derived from specific conjunctions of presentations. Such would be the affirmation. "The tree swayed in the wind," &c., in which there is a real extension of our knowledge of the subject, an express association of a new attribute with the original concept. But Kant also held that there were certain synthetic propositions to which attached a universality and necessity not given in experience, but arising from their *a priori* character. This test had by the way been previously employed by Leibnitz. Among these were mathematical assertions, such as 7+5=12, 'two straight lines cannot enclose a space,' 'a straight line is the shortest way between two points,' and others. 'Every event has a cause,' 'the quantity of matter in nature is constant,' 'action and reaction are equal,' and so forth. Now to discover the conditions of the possibility of such *a priori* synthetic judgments was to him the clue to a true philosophy of knowledge.

Kant, be it noted, fully accepts the empiricist doctrine that all concrete knowledge originates in experience. "That all our knowledge," he writes, "begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise, otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity* to compare, connect, and to separate these..." But he by no means identifies that experience with the mere aggregate

* Cf. Leibnitz on Locke. "The senses, although necessary for all our actual cognitions, are not, however, competent to afford us all that our cognitions involve."

of associated sensations, visual, auditory, tactual, muscular, &c., into which the empirical schools had resolved it. True it was that sensation constituted the 'matter' content or filling of knowledge; the Ego, however, about which anon, also directly contributed its quota. The transcendental or *a priori* conditions of having distinguishable sensations at all are to be recognised in the forms of Space and Time which constitute the arena in which feelings acquire their primal relations.* By means, then, of these Forms of Sensibility, there becomes assignable a 'when' and a 'where' to feelings, a preliminary fixation of their connections in what would otherwise be a mere chaotic blur. All phenomena may be stated in terms of time—those of the object consciousness, however, indirectly so—but only those of the "external intuition" as extended and having situation in space.† Neither Space nor Time is a mental concept proper in the sense of having been abstracted from experiences of particular spaces and times—the latter being only possible as products of the single Space and Time forms rendering such sensibility a fact. The Leibnitzian derivation of the "Concept" of Time from the succession of our states of consciousness is erroneous, as it ignores the fact that succession is itself a time determination. Time cannot be thus evolved from itself. The analysis, moreover, quite evades the fact of simultaneity as determination in time. Similarly the empirical associationist pedigree of Space implies, it is urged, spatial coexistences as its starting point. This view of Kant is forcibly emphasised by Professor Kuno Fischer: "The empirical explanation of space and time says merely this: we perceive things as they are in space and time and from that we abstract space and time. In other words, from space and time we abstract space and time. This is a perfect example of an explanation as it should *not* be. It explains the thing by itself. It pre-supposes, instead of explaining, what is to be explained."‡ The *a priori* character of these "Forms" is further guaranteed by our inability to abstract from them in thought. Originating, however, in the Ego whence they are elicited on the *occasion* of having sensations, these forms have no real objectivity, predicable of the world of "Things-in-Themselves," of reality as independent of the percipient. "Time," says Kant, "is not something which subsists of itself or inheres in things as an objective determination.....Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense." "Space," again, "does not represent any property of objects as things in themselves,

* Hence Schopenhauer's designation of space and time as the 'principia individuationis' alone admitting of discrimination between states of consciousness. Even the law of contradiction 'A is not non-A' involves says Kant, the time-determination of simultaneity to hold valid. A substance may shift an attribute in a time succession.

† May not *certain classes* of affections of the "inner sense" be said to manifest indirectly a spatial 'form?' I perceive a dog as an extended body—I remember it as a fainter replica of the original perception. The remembrance is ideally 'extended.'

‡ "Commentary on Kant's Critique." Mahaffy's Translation, p. 37.

nor does it represent them in their relations to each other.....Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the external sense." The having of sensations in space and time Kant calls "intuition"—a specific sense of this ambiguous word which must once and for all be grasped. It is not to be confounded with the stage of completed perception. This "Transcendental Æsthetic" alone serves to acquaint us with the strongly idealist implications of the *Critique*, one upshot of which is to the effect that the so-called external world has no more objective reality than a dream. In Kant's words:—

"Supposing we should carry our empirical intuition even to the very highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby advance one step nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things-in-themselves. For we could only, at best, arrive at a *complete cognition* of our own mode of intuition, that is, of our sensibility, and this always under the conditions originally attaching to the subject, namely, the conditions of space and time, while the question "What are objects considered as Things-in-Themselves remains unanswerable even after the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world."*

According, therefore, to Kant, neither the Forms of Sensibility nor the Sensations themselves mirror any objective reality in our consciousness. Perception is only of phenomena; the subject and object distinctions of psychology become merely contrasted aspects of the content of the Ego.

Nevertheless, Kant holds to the familiar old hypothesis that a cosmos of unknown objective realities does really exist beyond consciousness, despite a significant waver at times. How unceremoniously his successors brushed away his cherished universe of Noumena, we shall see later on.

Space and Time as the foundation of Mathematics.

An important department of the Transcendental Æsthetic now demands notice. Space and Time have to be considered as conditions of the cognitions of Pure Mathematics. Now space-determinations constitute the subject-matter of Geometry which deals with spatial configurations; time-determinations of Arithmetic and the mathematical sciences founded on it. Numbers, for instance, as formed by counting, imply successive addition of units in time. Lastly, motion, the stay of mechanics, presupposes the two conditions of Time and Space. Space thus yields the possibility of Geometry, Time of Arithmetic, etc., Space and Time conjoined that of Mechanics; all three departments of research, presupposing, of course, the 'matter' of sensation necessary to elicit the 'Form.' If, however, argues Kant, Space and Time are *a priori* conditions of consciousness-in-general, the determinations of space and time phenomena must be universal and necessary. To take concrete instances, it must always be certain that every straight line will, when observed, be found to be the shortest way between two points, and that 2+2 will

* "Critique of Pure Reason." *Transcendental Æsthetic*, "Bohn's" Trans., p. 36.

always, under any circumstances, =4. Hence in the *a priori* nature of Space and Time we have found the ground of the possibility of the synthetic *a priori* judgments of Mathematics. The reliability of the basic 'axioms' and 'postulates' of the latter is thus—within the domain of experience—complete. And to establish against scepticism the universality and necessity of certain fundamental principles was just one of the central aims of Kantism. But this said universality and necessity has, on the other hand, no possible sanction when predicated of things-in-themselves beyond experience. Apropos of the expression Forms of Sensibility, it is necessary to observe that Kant partitions off the knowledge-yielding phases of the Mind into the divisions of Sensibility, Understanding and Reason; by Understanding being meant the Judging and by Reason the ratiocinative faculties so-called. The aforesaid arbitrary departments have, it is almost needless to say, no standing whatever in modern psychology. It is as well, however, to state the distinction, if we are to throw a clear light on every step of our advance.

The Transcendental Analytic.

Now in order that the timed and spaced sensations above noted may develope into ripe experience of objects, the factor so glibly taken over by the psychology of Hobbes and others, a further series of processes is necessary. We are now on the threshold of the "Transcendental Analytic," the central problem of which is the investigation of the *a priori* conditions of Judgment. First and foremost we have to note the "Pure Understanding" with her brood of categories or Thought-forms whose agency is requisite to relate the sensations as yet only loosely unified in space and time. What is meant by this? According to Kant, when we assert of sensation that it is a Unity, a Whole, a Multiplicity, a substance having attributes or attribute of a substance, an efficient cause of an event, &c., &c., the 'matter,' of our intuitions is subsumed under and shaped by certain Categories or pure concepts constituting the native furniture of the Ego in its aspect as understanding. The function of these Categories must not be confused with that of Aristotle's, whose table was intended to stand for a classification of Predicates inductively generalized, with the view of analyzing the import of propositions. Kant's forms, on the other hand, are brought forward to exhibit the *a priori* machinery of the process of knowing itself. In no sense, again, are they to be identified with the crude doctrine of Innate Ideas, for they are not superimposed on a given world of experience, but they make that world itself. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that the whole Kantian mechanism, whereby experience of objects comes to exist, transcends the domain of what is known as the empirical consciousness, that is the mind as revealed by introspective psychology.

To think is to judge, that is, to unify presentations under certain forms of relation. To think is, in short, to have relations established between feelings. Now in the Kantian system it is the Pure Understand-

ing which spontaneously connects the timed and spaced deliverances of sensibility under certain judgment forms answering to or rather constituting the application of its own *a priori* concepts. It may be here asked —How are these pure concepts got at in the first instance—? How also is their precise number ascertained?

The answer runs as follows. By abstracting from the merely contingent or casual 'matter' of the just noted judgments so as to lay bare their basic conditions. Taking over the ordinary logical classification of judgments—12 in all—Kant educes from each what he holds to be the *a priori* concept locked up in it. Now, in the old analysis of these, the variety of possible statements was made to fall under four main heads expressive of connexions of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, each of which had three subordinate divisions. To the anatomy of these four classes of propositions Kant accordingly addresses himself. In his ingenious if somewhat forced fashion he succeeds in dissecting out three pure concepts of Quantity, *Unity*, *Plurality* and *Totality* answering to Singular, Particular and Universal judgments; three of Quality, *Reality* (agreement), *Negation* (disagreement), and *Limitation* (partial agreement), answering to Affirmative, Negative, and Infinite judgments; three of Relation, *Substance* and *Attribute*, *Causality* and *Community* or Reciprocal Action* answering to Categorical, Hypothetical and Disjunctive judgments; and three of Modality or mode of existence, *Possibility—Impossibility*, *Existence—non-Existence*, *Necessity—Contingence*, answering to problematical, assertory, and apodeictic judgments. All these are "judging," not empirical concepts, yielding only modes of conjoining presentations. They are not drawn from experience, but experience, *i. e.*, the realized world in space and time is made by them. Nevertheless they have no validity whatever save as forms constitutive of what is so neatly termed by Professor Bain the object-consciousness. They cannot be held determinative of Noumena.

Experience then is the result of the ordering according to relations supplied by these Category-sprung forms of judgment of sensations in space and time.† Only thus does the concrete world of perception come to exist. Only thus is constructed that varied universe which the French and English empiricists had so persistently taken over in the lump as a fact superior to analysis.

* Things are seen to what they are by mutual determination. This is the Category the abuse of which Fichte charges to the account of the imperfect idealism of Berkeley.

† A contingent judgment is termed by Kant a Judgment of Perception. It is only the objective experience common to all percipients—the world—which is given universally and necessarily. "Experience consists in a synthetic connection of phenomena in a consciousness, in so far as this is necessary. Hence pure conceptions of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must be previously subsumed, before they can serve as judgments of experience, in which the synthetic unity of perception is presented as necessary and universal." *Kant* (*Prolegomena*).

DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.

But whence these instruments of Synthesis, the unifying Categories whence the Forms of Sensibility themselves? From what 'undiscovered bourne' emerge these moulds elicited by the sensations with which they blend. From the Pure Ego or Transcendental Subject the "Synthetic Unity of Apperception" as it is termed. This Transcendental Subject, for which Categories and Sense Forms do not as such exist, but in which they find their basis, is then the bottom foundation of the structure of knowledge. Psychology is justified in evolving the empirical self or mind from assimilated and worked up Experience, but it is the Transcendental Subject which "at the back of beyont" really weaves together that Experience. According to Kant the 'I think' of this ultimate synthetic unity is thus the primal root of the tree which blossoms out into Perception, Memory, Conception, Reasoning, Imagination and the rest. Sensations alone are left undeduced from this Ego. Some very important issues are, as we shall see, involved in this positing of a Transcendental Subject and contrast of it with the empirical or derivative mind alone recognized by the analytical psychologist. With these questions we shall deal hereafter. Meanwhile it is instructive to note the staunch manner in which the great Kantian and post-Kantian thinkers upheld the doctrine of an *Ego* as distinct from the transitory content of experience. Contrasted with some phases of modern English empiricism, it may well afford food for thought.

FURTHER ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE.

Such then in their essentials are the principles of the speculative side of the Kantian system. There remain, of course, many interstices in the structure to be mortared up. For instance, the working of the categories involves or rather presupposes three further important conditions or unifying processes termed by Kant (1) the 'synthesis of apprehension in intuition,' (2) the 'synthesis of reproduction in imagination,' and (3) the 'recognition in the conception.' No. (1) gathers up and associates the coalescing patches of sensation grasped in any intuition. Unity of presentation would otherwise be impossible; even the unity of space and time must be given in this way. But this synthesizing of any successive points a, b, and c, in intuition itself presupposes the reproductive faculty of imagination. When I am apprehending one side of a triangle, the two others if already intuited must be reproduced in memory to ensure a complete and intelligible presentation. Chaos would otherwise result. Combination of old sensations with new has necessarily to be provided for. But how am I to be conscious that the reproduced sensations mirror the original? How do I know they were once mine at all? By 'recognition in the conception' the actuality of which is alone supposed to be competent to establish the Ego as permanent ground of connexion between the successively vanishing patches of feeling. "If I forget," says Kant, "in counting that the unities which are present before my senses have been

successively added by me, I should not understand the creation of multitude through this successive addition of one to one and hence I should not understand number, a conception consisting chiefly in the consciousness of this unity in synthesis." These three pre-requisites of the due functioning of the categories are obviously *a priori*, being indeed more remote from any specific experience than the thought-form itself. We may find them all three blending in a perception which involves definite relations of likeness and unlikeness between a present sensation-cluster and the intentionally revived vestige of a former. Now a not unnatural impulse of the critic would be, to brush away these clumsy looking 'processes,' and reduce their several phenomena to so many aspects of the Law of Association of Ideas with or without the postulation of an Ego. His contention would be reinforced by the consideration that, despite all the suggestive writing of Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume and other psychologists, Associationism as a methodic theory was, until comparatively of late years, almost ignored by continental thinkers. But the Kantian system, let it be noted, would not have sought to 'explain' the integration and revivability of feelings merely on associationist lines. Its standpoint is not empirical but speculative. For, after all, the method of the empirical psychologists constitutes nothing more than an inductive grouping of ready-made mental relations. For Kant the problem was not that of a comprehensive classification; the fact of Association itself had to be accounted for, the *ground of the associability* of feelings, not the empirical discovery that they are associated, had to be dealt with. Accordingly he sought to exhibit his three processes, as a vital and purposive portion of the *a priori* machinery rendering human consciousness possible. Knowledge was indeed to Kant an actuality realized from the inmost depths of the soul in the mysterious workshop of which all experience was elaborated.

SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES.

In addition to this, it remains to consider the somewhat artificial exposition as to how the actual marriage between the sensations and the categories is consummated. Here all the sharp distinctions between the various aspects of intellect come again into prominence. Into this portion of the Critique the so-called 'Schematism of the categories' it is scarcely profitable to enter at any length. Schopenhauer's analysis of its weakness is in my opinion quite beyond criticism. He shows that Kant in his favourite pursuit after transcendental correspondencies has extended an induction valid on conceptualist lines of empirical concepts into the realm of the utterly alien pure concepts. It is, indeed, a highly rarefied version of the conceptualist 'abstract idea' that we are here dealing with.

The supposed function of the schema (which is, of course, explained as the creation of the "productive imagination" not of the empirical mind but of the transcendental subject) is to effect the application of the pure concepts to sensuous phenomena. Between these heterogeneous twain mediation is brought about by the pure form of time, conterminous alike with both, being at the same time *a priori*, and embracing all phenomena. The time-determination in which the category take shape constitutes its schematism. Has this determination a corresponding image or idea after the same fashion as an individual object subsequent to perception? It has not. Strictly speaking no such image is possible in the case of any general concept. Nevertheless the modified category may be said to possess a species of shadowy outline not susceptible of vivid presentation. This vague outline is the schema of Kant considered as a creation of the *a priori* productive imagination. Now there are four possible types of determination in time, that of the *time series* or number, *time content*, *time order and comprehension in time*. Otherwise expressed states of consciousness possess Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality or mode of existence in time. The schemata groups answering to the four divisions of the categories are, thus, decipherable as (1) 'number,' (2) 'filled,' 'filling' and 'empty,' time, (3) 'change' and 'continuance,' 'succession,' 'simultaneity,' (4). 'Sometime,' 'now,' 'always'. By means of these schemata, the understanding is enabled to fuse phenomena and the pure concepts into intelligible unity and so to make experience. The position of chief importance is, it may be added, assigned to the mathematical or Quantity and Quality groups. All the above is matter for the transcendental faculty of judging.

A PRIORI PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE.

Yet another pedigree, that of the fundamental *a priori* principles of science as elaborated by the transcendental judging of the pure understanding, must now be traced. These again, will be found to run parallel with the four classes of categories as tabulated by Kant. It is in this portion of our inquiry that we confront the Analytic of Principles, the much debated division of that "Transcendental Analytic" which started with an examination of the pure concepts. It affords us the synthetic *a priori* rules for the objective application of the latter.

Springing from the schema of number is the axiom of perception embodying the fact that all objects are extensive quantities composed of divisible parts. The atom as theoretic object of possible perception is, therefore, a myth. In the 'anticipations of perception' we have the law that sensations as such, though lacking spatial attributes, possess all alike intensive degree. Number as involved in successive degrees has also an implication here. But it relates not to a time series but time content. In the 'Analogies of Experience'* born from the relation schemata we have the principles 'amid all changes of phenomena substance abides the same,' 'every change happens according to the law of

* "Analogies," because they are neither of the nature of the axiom nor anticipations, applying only to particular cases. They do not determine judgment, but indicate the rule according to which any given case must be treated.

cause and effect,' and ' substances co-existing in space act and re-act on one another.' Lastly the Modality group yields the *three postulates* of all empirical thinking which lay down what is possible, actual or necessary:—1. ' That which agrees with the formal conditions (as to intuitions and conceptions) of experience is possible. 2. That which agrees with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is real. 3. That whose coherence with the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary.' Principles other than these must be obtained by inductive generalization proper in the conscious exercise of the empirical reason. They must be formulated out of comparison of particular judgments of experience. The assertion of the categories for all phenomena can yield only the very limited number of *a priori* laws above given.

Now Analogies and Postulates are dynamical, that is to say, they determine the existence of things, whereas the axiom and anticipations of perception are mathematical as determinative of quantities. To cite Professor Fischer's lucid abstract: " The two mathematical principles in conjunction form the law of *continuity*; the two dynamical, the law of *causality or necessity*. When summed up in a single formula: *All objects of possible experience are, as to form, continuous quantities; as to existence, necessary effects.* Each principle declares its contradictory to be impossible. The negative expression of them is an immediate obvious consequence. The law of continuity expressed negatively is this: *there are no gaps in nature—non datur saltus*; the law of causality or necessity, when negatively expressed, is this; neither is there in nature no necessity, nor blind necessity; *neither chance nor fate—non datur casus, non datur fatum.* From the continuity of extensive quantities follows the *impossibility of atoms*; from the *continuity of intensive the impossibility of a* vacuum—*non datur hiatus.*" In such wise, then, is justified our previous remark as to the Kantian derivation of knowledge from the inmost depths of the soul. Experience now clearly appears as a preponderatingly subjective product. The Materialism of the contemporary French School has lost its very foundation.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Passing over the subsidiary discussions appended to the "Analytic," let us now glance at the problems treated of in the " Transcendental Dialectic" of the Reason, that supposed division of the Intellect whose logical function is the drawing of conclusions as opposed to the judging function of the understanding and the intuitions of sense. The problem here propounded for solution may be phrased—Is a dogmatic ontology possible? Now, there are two ways in which the Reason may work—it may ascend from the particular judgment to the most general propositions or *vice versâ*. Regressive syllogistic inference from the conditioned particular fact to unconditioned universal First Principles is the aim of ontology. It cannot, however, hope to seize on universal truths valid of Noumena. Even the *a priori* ideas which Reason possesses are only of a ' regulative' nature and in no fashion ' constitutive' or representative of reality. For just as sense has its forms of intuition, and the understanding its categories, so Reason is equipped with three *a priori* ideas. These are (1) the psychological idea of the soul as a thinking substance immaterial, simple and indestructible, (2) the cosmological idea of the world as a system or connected totality of phenomena, and (3) the theological idea of God as supreme condition of the possibility of all beings. If, however, these ' ideas' have no real application to Noumena, what, it will be asked, is their function? The reply is that they serve as nuclei of comprehensive thought, as rallying points for the unification of our relative experience up to the hoped for level of the Absolute and Unconditioned. Just as the Understanding unifies the phenomena of intuition into experience, so does the Reason by means of its ' ideas' unify experience into the widest generalities. Our impulse, however, to accredit our conclusions thus generated with noumenal validity constitutes a spurious application of the ' Categories' to things outside their domain. Ontology, that is to say, the science of reality as it is beyond our conditioned thinking, is impossible. Hence it is that on its critical side, the Kantian teaching debouches into a pure Agnosticism. In pursuance of his theme the Konigsberg thinker proceeds to demonstrate the bankruptcy of ontology in the course of his treatment of the " Paralogisms," " Antinomies," and the " Ideal of the Pure Reason." Apropos of the soul, his main point is the impossibility owing to the nature of thought of the Ego knowing itself in its pure form; the empirical mind or " personality," unified as " substance" under the schema of ' permanence' being alone open to introspection. The veiled ego in which the categories inhere, cannot determine itself by these categories. Dealing with cosmology, he takes the four theses of the Wolffians ' the world has a beginning in time and space,' ' everything in the world consists of simple parts, &c.,' and opposes them to their antitheses. It is shown that these two classes of mutually destructive propositions rest alike on universally admitted principles. Reason is divided against herself; the basic explanation being that arguments valid only of phenomena, actual or possible, are constantly applied to Noumena or things as they are ' outside' consciousness. In assailing the theological brief for the existence of a Personal God that " sum-total of all perfection and reality," Kant lays the axe in turn to the three celebrated lines of proof—the ' ontological', ' cosmological' and ' telelogical' arguments. Finally, he comes to the conclusion that the reality or non-reality of such a God are equally undemonstrable. It is instructive in this connection, to note how Fichte subsequently re-establishes Deity (impersonal) as ground of experience itself.

So much for the agnostic outcome of Kant's speculative analysis of experience. A rational ontology or theology is impossible. But a

strange surprise is in store for us. The tenets of a God, immortality and free will have no theoretic ground in the critical philosophy. But are they absolutely mere figments questions our philosopher harking back to the dreams of the Leibnitz-Wolffian dogmatists ? In no sense. Their validity is guaranteed to us by a practical necessity yielded by observation of the moral law.

POSTULATES OF THE PRACTICAL REASON.

For Kant the supreme arbiter of morality is what he calls the Categorical Imperative of the Practical Reason. 'Pragmatical' laws of morality subserve our happiness alone and concern our empirical motives in the sphere of good sense and prudence. But the moral law urges action, having for its object the elevation of character and virtue for its own sake quite irrespective of our immediate well-being. Happiness is the natural good we seek; worth the moral goal, any joy attendant on which comes unsought. But this moral domain and moral end presupposes a moral government of the world—a God. Thus this notion of the unconditioned, though avowedly regulative only, is *something more than a mere negation.* The reach after an Absolute is not so utterly vain as in the system of Sir W. Hamilton. And not only this but scope is required for full realisation of the moral ideal in a "future life," where all balances will be adjusted. Freedom of the will is proved because the "ought" of the Categorical Imperative implies a "can."* These positions constitute true faith, a hope based on moral certitude. No real addition of knowledge is given (?) In adopting the term *Categorical* Imperative, Kant has been charged with resting his case on a confusion between the knowing and the volitional phases of the mind. There can be no question but that this accusation has great force.† Apart from this issue, it is important to note that the part thus assigned to the pure Ego or Transcendental Subject—the source of the moral law—in guiding the decisions of the empirical consciousness has opened up a theme of considerable suggestiveness. Now-a-days the tendency is to regard manifestations of this supposed moral law as inherited bias to conduct springing from organization of experiences of utility in the history of ancestral organisms. Morality is relative to

* The "Practical Reason" of Kant is the productive or pure ego, in which the categories, &c., inhere, but which is never object of consciousness. The will as Noumenal reality dictates the moral law to the empirical consciousness. Properly speaking, however, this dictation is an avenue for a new sort of knowledge of an intuitive character and should so be regarded. It is not will. The whole Kantian reconciliation of *empirical necessity* with *transcendental freedom* was shown by Herbart to be illusory. Empirical necessity is just the necessarian contention. It is freedom of the individual "will" as phenomenon of a personal conscious mind which the Libertarians assert. A mind bound in the chains of causality (albeit those chains are primarily imposed by the pure ego), can only be determined to a spurious show of self-determination. Kant's intervention of will as Noumenon is tantamount merely to an impulse added ab extra. It is a fresh bias to action which, if sufficiently potent, the causally-bound Mind is *ex-hypothesi* unable to resist.

† Vide above note.

racial stages but on evolutionist lines largely intuitive to the individual. The point, however, mooted in the tentative Kantian scheme is the introduction into the empirical consciousness of a possible stimulus to knowledge or will drawn from a Transcendental or Higher individual soul-life not yet explored by psychology. In the "Philosophy of Mysticism" of the Kantian Carl du Prel, the wisdom of this 'higher self' as evidenced in the relatively rare cases of hypnotic clairvoyance is carefully entered into. We shall recur at length to this supremely momentous issue at a later stage of these lectures.

CRITICISM OF THE CRITIQUE.

Into Kant's notable contributions to the theory of History, Astronomy and Anthropology, it is not here necessary to digress. Touching other more relevant issues, there are indications that in his later years he inclined to a belief in Palingenesis for the 'soul.' He also expresses himself favourable to the view that a world of supersensuous beings environs this planet, and that the establishment of communication with such beings is only a matter of time. Kant, indeed, was far too acute not to see that a speculative Agnosticism (while shutting out the possibility of absolute knowledge of realities), *cannot possibly assert that there is no plane of relative or phenomenal experience except that called the 'physical world.'* Contrariwise there may be innumerable strata of materiality, all alike relative to the consciousness of their 'percipients.' This view, indeed, would be endorsed to the full by Hindu Adwaita philosophy. It is conceivable, also, that there exist intelligences untrammelled by the conditions of our relative human perception and thinking. So much for these often conveniently ignored portions of his system. With regard to the general criticism of his labours, it is agreed on all sides that in the sage of Konigsberg we confront one of the profoundest thinkers in history. His influence has given an impetus of candour and thoroughness to all subsequent philosophy worthy of the name, and it is essential for the student to first review his standpoint before running up a possibly ramshackle system of his own. Spots on this sun there are, and these, as was indeed necessary, not a few. Objection may be raised to his arbitrary partitioning of the "faculties," his patent hunt after symmetry, and his pedantic terminology. Thus, understanding and reason strike the psychological ear as artificial divisions resting on a mere quibble; the extraction of the concepts, in particular that of reciprocity from the disjunctive judgment, is often forced, while the derivation of the "Ideas" from the form of the syllogism is almost grotesque. It would, moreover, in the present state of knowledge be out of the question to argue their *a priori* character of these latter as utilized by Kant. Touching the conditions of knowing, the disjointed looking machinery embodied in the schemata of the imagination, the stereotyped concepts of the understanding, the really undeduced sensations, and the synthesis of apprehension, &c., has a strangely artificial ring. The elements in question lack the necessary fusion. Then, again, Kant is undeniably

open to Herbert Spencer's indictment of dealing only with the consciousness of the adult individual man, which is quite other in composition to that of the infant in arms, if careful inference from observation counts for anything.* It is clear, for instance, that our sensations of sound and smell do not primarily involve any space attributes whatever. I would also add in this connection the consideration that, while holding space and time to be the forms of sensations, Kant does not at all make it clear how or on what principle the sensations in question are arranged and distributed in the detail. The mode of disposition in order of co-existence, simultaneity and succession is the crux. Assuming this to be determined by the pure Ego, the idealist drift of the 'Critique' becomes still more accentuated. With the whole question of space and time we must deal hereafter.

With reference to the categories, the following additional remarks may be offered. Thes ource whence they are dug is far from being superior to criticism. In Mr. Mansel's words, "the Kantian categories are not deduced from the act of thought, but generalized from the forms of the proposition which latter are assumed without examination, as they are given in the ordinary logic. A psychological deduction, or preliminary criticism, of the forms themselves might have considerably reduced the number."† Prof. Kuno Fischer, a warm admirer of Kant, remarks, that the "architectonic fancies" of the Konigsberg thinker have yielded this too elaborate appendage of pure concepts. "Community" side by side with "Causality;" "Unity," "Plurality," "Totality," and the Modality group are not to overstate the matter at all, wholly indefensible. "Community" in one aspect may be resolved into Causality *plus* co-existence due to the space form. We then have the mutual determination of objects making them what they are. Its so-called 'transcendent use by Berkeley to explain experience as the action of Divine Mind on human minds is an extension of simple causality. These two aspects exhaust its supposed scope. Unity again, as predicated of an object, is a name for the fact that certain sensations are given in a cohering cluster resisting disintegration. The fixation of sensations in the space-form ought, on Kantian lines, to be indicated as the true source of such coherence. In like manner we may dispose of "Plurality" and "Totality."‡ The forms seemingly best accredited are "substance" and "causality." Kant has, indeed, despite his belief in objects, laid exaggerated stress on the 'form' as opposed to the 'content' of experience. His successors have consequently made havoc with the list of categories. Cousin is satisfied with substance and causality, Fischer and Schopenhauer with causality, while Schelling takes over the relation group as the basis of the rest. Fichte's attitude is yet to be described, it is markedly progressive. Hegel, it is true, goes so far as to add an entirely new group, but his standpoint is an outgrowth of his unique 'Logic.' Schopenhauer, moreover, when treating of the Categories, severely criticises Kant's sharp frontier line between intuition and thought. Finally it should be noted that from the supposed radical contrast obtaining between sensation and the numerous categories springs, also, the hazy schematism already noticed. Kant failed to realize that sensations, even if excited by some non-Ego, are just as much subjective existences as any concept of the understanding. The gulf between the two is merely imaginary, granting the initial fact that any pure concepts are discoverable at all.

* "Principles of Psychology," Vol II., p. 181.

† "Metaphysics," p. 193, note.

‡ "Unity," as predicated of the knowing subject *for which and in which* the object exists, broaches quite a distinct issue. Here it is to Fichte that we may look for light, and we discover, accordingly, that he very properly discards the Kantian hypostasis of an "abstract" form and identifies the unity in question with the stage of self-affirmation of itself by the Ego.

In conclusion it cannot for a moment be maintained that Kant's retention of a world independent of consciousness is justifiable. Things-in-themselves are superfluous. How indeed is it possible to step outside experience when the categories and forms of sensibility are purely relative to the knowing subject. In the much discussed 2nd Edition of the Critique, Kant touches very suggestively on the difficulty which, however, he appears only in part to have realised. "There is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could not make abstraction, and that is that the manifold to be intuited must be given previous to the synthesis of the understanding and independently of it; *but how remains here undetermined.*" Now it is obvious enough that between this agnostic attitude and his customary positing of a world of unknown objects there is a great gulf fixed. The, latter dogma is, indeed, alien to the spirit of the Kantian teaching. True, the sensations are said to be impressed on us by stimuli from a non-Ego, but what does this non-ego really mean? Not externality in space, for that is only an attribute springing from a subjective pre-requisite of knowing. In strict accuracy, it means nothing at all. For it cannot be too clearly noted that the reduction of Causality to a mere Category annihilates all call for any extra-subjective derivation of sensations. To postulate a world of things as their excitant is, in the first place, to put behind perception a sort of nebulous duplicate of the self same external world which Kant had already demolished in theory. In the second place, causality being a pure concept, has no possible import when employed in the pursuit of such would be extra-experiential knowledge. Sensations, therefore, if not drawn from the pure ego itself, are, according to Kant's own showing, inexplicable and do not in any sense involve the postulation of an objective world as thing-in-itself.

KANT'S BEQUEST TO PHILOSOPHY.

The great heirloom, however, which Kant bequeathed to posterity was not so much the detail work as the 'Critical Method' of his system considered as a search after the transcendental basis of knowledge. He had seized the central problem of philosophy and hewed for himself a wide clearing in the midst of a virgin forest. It will now be of interest to note the

great advance on his efforts made by his famous disciple Fichte, in whose hands the critical philosophy expanded into a systematic idealism Fichte's task consisted in carrying forward the principles of the speculative method which Kant had bequeathed as a 'Novum Organon' to German philosophy. The future of this method, as will have been seen, is its uncompromising departure from the tracks of inductive psychology. It is not content to generalize the facts of the so-called 'inner' and 'outer' (subject and object) aspects of our states of consciousness. It seeks to unveil the whole of the pre-mental conditions whereby such contrasted states of consciousness come to exist. And it seeks to effect this aim by careful analysis of what we term "mind" into its primal elements, testing the validity of its results by subsequently recombining in thought these elements into the original whole. Experience is explained by the factors which its evolution is held to pre-suppose. Further, the speculative method as enunciated by Fichte and Hegel will admit of no explanation of experience which steps outside the circle of pure self-consciousness. We shall, however, have cause to see that the gist of this position is something very far removed from the fanciful subjective idealism which makes every individual mind create its own world.

Reviews.

"THE ACCURSED SCIENCES."*

"Au Seuil du Mysteré" is the first of Mr. Stanislas de Guaita's "Essais de Sciences Maudites;" the second essay, "Le Serpent de Genése," being in the press. The handsome octavo volume of 200 pages now before us is an enlarged edition of a successful pamphlet of the same name published four years ago. It has a large Appendix and also two excellent symbolical engravings copied from Henri Kunrath.

French Theosophists cultivate and value erudition in occult studies more than their English-speaking brothers, and from their stand-point this is one of the "monumental" works which have been given to the public of late years by Fellows or friends of our Society; and it is a work which will be a treat to those of whatever nationality who set a high value on erudition combined with sentiment as a means for the attainment of occult knowledge.

Like many other French students of Occultism, M. de Guaita seems to revolve round the Kabbala as a central point, and this gives a biblical flavour to all his work, that is not altogether delightful to those who wander further East in search of the rising sun. Our author does not think very much of St. Germain, Mesmer or Cagliostro, who were, he says, "extraordinary realizers," but not "superior adepts." His three superior adepts are Fabre d'Olivet, the Marquis de Saint Yves d'Alveydre, and Eliphas Levi, the last of whom he considers the "greatest of adepts!" M. de Guaita makes mention in several places of the Theosophical Society in very friendly and respectful terms, and pays a graceful tribute to the genius of Madame Blavatsky, although he does not seem to be a great admirer of that lady's rather intense personality.

* Essais de Sciences Maudites; I. Au Seuil du Mysteré, par *Stanislas de Guaita*. eor ge Carré, Paris, 1890. pp. 200. 8vo.

As its name implies—"On the Threshold of Mystery"—this first Essay of the series is devoted to general considerations and philosophico-occult reflections that go over old ground; but the Appendix contains several excellent monographs of more concrete interest, on the Amphitheatrum and other works of Kunrath, on the Rosy Cross, and on the Martinists, together with an appreciative review of Mr. Alber Jhouney's "Le Royamue de Dieu."

M. de Guaita is not among those who, could they do so, would popularize ocultism. He quotes with express approval the opinion of Synsius, an early Christian bishop, commencing: "The people will always scoff at simple truths; they require to be imposed upon." Like many of his countrymen, he expresses clear ideas in felicitous language, but he shares with them in the defect of this excellent quality—too great a love of order, regularity and completeness, at least to be wholly in touch with the Anglo-Saxon mind, which believes more in spontaniety and the clash of interests and discoveries, than in rigid codes and perfected theories.

In conclusion we will quote the very significant paragraph cited by M. de Guaita from the "Origines de l'Alchimie" of M. Berthelot, the celebrated French chemist, preserving our author's italics and capitals.

"I have found not only the concatenation of ideas which led the Alchemists to pursue the transmutation of metals, but also the theory, the philosophy of nature, which served them for guide; *a theory founded upon the hypothesis of the unity of matter*, AND AT BOTTOM AS PLAUSIBLE AS THE MOST REPUTED AT PRESENT OF THE MODERN THEORIES.....*And strangely enough, the opinions to which the Savants of to-day are turning with regard to the constitution of matter, are not without analogy to the profound views of the ancient Alchemists.*"

MRS. BESANT'S PAMPHLET.

Notes and Queries (*The Bizarre*) says of Mrs. Besant's "Why I became a Theosophist:" "Every one should read this pamphlet, and see the arguments of a noble-hearted woman and leader of advanced thought."

Mr. P. J. Mehta, F. T. S., of Bhavnagar, has sent us for notice a book entitled "Yogakalpadruma," printed in large and clear Devanagari type. It is a collection of Sanskrit slokas composed by Paramahamsa-swami Brahmhananda. A Hindi translation is given for each sloka. There are 270 pages of duodecimo, and 271 subjects are treated in it. It appears to be a very important production; treating of Yoga Sastras, and giving practical instructions about different branches of Yoga practised in ancient India. Price Re. 1.

Correspondence.

THEOSOPHY IN WESTERN LANDS.

[*From our London Correspondent.*]

London, *June* 1890.

I am sorry to say that the first news I have to give you this month is not of a re-assuring character; for our dear H. P. Blavatsky's health shows very little sign of improvement as yet; although no worse than when I wrote last, she is, alas, scarcely any better; Dr. Mennell, however, allows her occasionally to do a little—a very little—writing.

The alterations at our new Head-quarters are now almost completed, and although the entire staff will not actually be living there by July 3rd, yet on the evening of that day the first meeting of the Blavatsky

Lodge is to take place in the new lecture-room, which is now finished, and is the most charming little hall you can imagine: about 200 can be comfortably seated therein, and we are hoping to fill it on the 3rd, to inaugurate the opening meeting of the Lodge at the new Head-quarters in a suitable and auspicious manner. Nearly all the well-known and prominent Theosophists living in and around London will, of course, be present, notably Mr. Sinnett, who will speak at some length upon the great future before Theosophy in this country.

You may remember reading, in my letter for this month's *Theosophist*, about the generosity of Mr. Chapman in providing a hall and library in the East End. This scheme is now completed, and the hall is to be opened on Tuesday, 24th inst. I think it is almost impossible to overestimate the enormous impetus which will be given the Theosophic work in the East End by the establishment of such an active centre as this, which Mr. Chapman has initiated, promises to be.

The 1st instant witnessed the opening of a new Lodge at Brighton, the well-known fashionable watering-place on the south coast ("London by the Sea," as it is commonly called). Our brother, W. Kingsland, who has been staying there for some time past, has been most actively engaged in making known the objects of the Theosophical movement, and enlisting the sympathies and co-operation of all who could be found to be interested in the matter. As a result, a new Lodge, to be called "The Brighton Lodge of the Theosophical Society," has been formed; open meetings will be held to study the "Key to Theosophy," and the nucleus of a lending library has already been formed. The President is Mr. Edward Ellis, M. A., the Secretary Mr. W. Siebenharr.

I must not omit to chronicle the welcome return from Australia of A. Keightley—"the Doctor." We all think him looking better and stronger than ever. Bertram Keightley, too, is expected now from America this week. C. F. Wright has now returned to the permanent staff of workers at our Head-quarters, leaving F. J. Dick to take his place as Secretary of the Dublin Lodge. Things begin to look very promising at Birmingham, our Theosophical Society members there having already procured a room for meeting and working in; which they trust will be the nucleus of a future Lodge to be formed there, and towards the establishment of which they are straining all their energies.

There seems to be a lull this month in the stream of articles, notices, leaders, etc., which has been pouring from the press of late upon questions nearly related to, if not actually bearing upon, occult matters. There must always be the ebb and flow in this, as in everything else; and we can hardly expect to claim much attention during the height and fever-heat of a London season.

The Belgian Government, I see, has determined to put into effect the resolutions adopted by the Brussels Academy of Medicine—that hypnotism should be made illegal except for medical purposes, and in the hands of qualified practitioners. Experimenters seem to prefer the use of mechanical means to that of personal influence, and M. Luys describes how he hypnotises a whole audience by causing them to look at a rapidly revolving wheel of variously coloured pieces of glass.

The Atlantic Monthly contains a capital little article entitled "The Easter Hare," from the pen of "Katherine Hillard," whose name as a writer and prominent Theosophist is so well known, both here and in America. She quotes largely from the "Secret Doctrine," giving many interesting facts connected with the popular superstition of which she treats; which must all tend to stimulate enquiry and interest, and as a "by-product" lead to the larger circulation of Madame Blavatsky's great work.

Giordano Bruno's name has been brought so much before the reading public lately, that I make no apology for giving you the gist of a long and interesting article by W. R. Thayer, which appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly*, called "The Trial, Opinions, and Death of Giordano Bruno;" the less so in that Mr. Thayer quotes certain opinions held by Bruno, and set forth by him in his writings, which will be seen to be in remarkably close accord with the teachings contained in the "Secret Doctrine," as tending towards the elucidation of problems, the solving of which still present apparently insuperable difficulties to modern scientists. The long "confession and apology of Giordano Bruno," which Thayer gives, he takes from the minutes of the Inquisition of Venice, so far as he has been able to interpret, as he says, "the ungrammatical, ill-punctuated report of the Secretary." Bruno, in his deposition before the Inquisition, proclaims that

"God is one and indivisible, the soul of the universe; that his attributes are power, wisdom, and love; that he is in all things, yet above all things, not to be understood, ineffable, and whether personal or impersonal man cannot say; that nature is his footprint, God being the soul of nature; that since every material atom is part of him, by virtue of his immanence in nature, it is eternal, and so are human souls immortal, being emanations from his immortal spirit; but whether souls preserve their identity, or whether, like the atoms, they are for ever re-composed into new forms, Bruno does not decide."

This, speaking broadly, is pure pantheism; and as a pantheist, says Thayer, we must necessarily classify Bruno—in that wide class which includes Spinoza, Göthe, Shelley, and Emerson. ("Within man is the soul of the whole," says the latter). "Bruno was inspired by the revelation that God's power is commensurate with infinitude, and that he cherishes all creatures and all things in all worlds." He explains that evil is relative, "nothing is absolutely bad," he says, "but each thing is bad in respect to some other." The immanence of the universal soul in the animal world he thus illustrates: "With what understanding the ant gnaws her grain of wheat, lest it should sprout in her underground habitation! The fool says this is instinct, *but we say it is a species of understanding.*" The conclusion of Mr. Thayer's admirable paper is worth quoting *in extenso*: it runs thus:—

"In an age when the growing bulk of rationalism casts a pessimistic shadow over so many hopes, it is encouraging to know that the rationalist Bruno saw no reason for despair.....At any period, when many minds, after exploring all the avenues of science, report that they perceive only dead, unintelligent matter everywhere, it must help some of them to learn that Bruno beheld *throughout the whole creation and in every creature, the presence of an infinite and endless unity*, of a soul of the world, whose attributes are power, wisdom, and love. He was indeed 'a god-intoxicated man.' Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Aquinas spun their cobwebs round the border of the narrow circle in which, they asserted, all truth, mundane and celestial, was comprehended.

"Bruno's restless spirit broke through the cobwebs, and discovered limitless spaces, innumerable worlds, beyond. To his enraptured eyes *all things were parts of the one, the Ineffable.* 'The Inquisition and the stake,' says Mr. Symonds, 'put an end abruptly to his dream. But the dream was so golden, so divine, that it was worth the pangs of martyrdom. By his death Bruno cannot be said to have proved that his convictions are true, but he proved beyond peradventure that he was a true man; and by such from the beginning has human nature been raised toward that ideal nature which we call divine."

The *present* Pope, in an allocution which has been read recently from every Romish pulpit in Christendom, says that Bruno's "writings prove him an adept in pantheism and in shameful materialism imbued with coarse errors, and often inconsistent with himself," etc. etc. And if he, as Mr. Thayer says, that Leo the XIIIth hears still sounding in his ears, and hearing—trembles—those memorable words of Bruno's to the

Romish hierarchy of his day—when sentence of death was pronounced against him by Cardinal Mandruzzi, the Supreme Inquisitor—"Peradventure you pronounce this sentence against me with greater fear than I receive it?" Judging from the recent alarm in the Vatican, I should be inclined to answer—yes!—"A Study of Consciousness," is the title of a very good article, by H. C. Wood, which appears in the *Century*; it affords another illustration of the widespread "self-questioning" now going on everywhere, in all ranks of social life, and evidenced by the extraordinary success of such books as the "Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," and "Archibald Malmaison." As Mr. Wood says:—

"Not only do we ask, What shall I be? but also, What am I? In consonance with this questioning the Ego is perpetually the theme of eloquent discourse. To define, in terms clear and sharp, the exact meaning of the Ego of the popular philosopher would be a task of difficulty: but certainly underneath all human individuality is the faculty or attribute of consciousness. If, in a general company, the question should be asked, Is there such a thing as unconsciousness? almost everyone would at once reply, 'Of course there is, the stone is unconscious, the corpse is unconscious, we are unconscious in sleep.' Such answers would, however, be too flippant."

Mr. Wood then proceeds to elaborate his subject with great skill. He says that although he is not going to assert positively that all matter has consciousness, yet that he feels it to be very difficult to prove that either the stick or the stone is unconscious, and that he, at least, knows of no way of positively demonstrating it. Here Mr. Wood approaches very nearly to the Eastern teachings, which tell us that there is no such thing as the so-called inorganic matter of the Western scientists, but that life certainly, and consciousness also—of a certain order—pervades and is inherent in, everything. He then gives instances of the ordinary tests of consciousness, and states that they are, by themselves, fallacious, as the most vivid consciousness may exist, and one or more of the tests fail entirely; "Do three naughts," he says, "joined together, make a whole number? Does the heaping up of fallacies give us an impregnable fortress of truth? If I am able to show the correctness of my assertion that each of these tests (three in number) of consciousness is fallacious, I insist that there is no absolute proof of unconsciousness." Then, drawing from his evidently wide experience as a hospital surgeon in Philadelphia, Mr Wood gives some cases of epilepsy, where the memory is apparently entirely lost; other cases of somnambulism and artificial hypnotism; and quotes instances of people buried alive—and so on, through several most interesting pages. The inference being, that if all our tests of the presence of consciousness fail, surely we cannot be said to *know* that anything is unconscious? As a matter of fact, we do not, we simply *believe* that things are unconscious. Unconsciousness, Mr. Wood says, is a negative condition—as we only arrive at our belief by a process of negative reasoning based upon the absence of certain attributes. "A negative is never an absolute proof." He then gives some curious examples of those strangest of all cases, double consciousness; phenomena before which science is dumb—for, as he says, "Merely in the presence of ordinary every day consciousness, without voice is that science which can drag from the bowels of the earth the records of creation, and can reach to the sun to weigh and analyze the power of the present. Consciousness is truly the one supreme fact of the universe, mysterious, inexplicable for all time, beyond human understanding."

A. L. C.

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सत्यात् नास्ति परो धर्मः ।

THERE IS NO RELIGION HIGHER THAN TRUTH.

[*Family motto of the Maharajahs of Benares.*]

MRS. WATTS HUGHES' SOUND-PICTURES.

AN acoustical phenomenon has been stumbled upon by a Welsh lady of position—Mrs. Watts Hughes—which is provoking the interest of men of science and the wonder of many of the profane. It is, in truth, very striking: most interesting to the student of occultism. To him, it is another proof that we are living in a time of, what might be called, akasic *osmosis*—the infiltration of the astral into the physical plane of consciousness. The partition between the two worlds is proving itself as porous and penetrable as the membrane between two fluids of different densities in the familiar chemical experiment. The deeper potentialities of thought, life-force, sound, chromatics, heat and electricity, are being successively revealed. To cap all, there is Keeley's inter-etheric force, whose titanic energies are just being demonstrated. On the plane of physics, on that of mental dynamics, that of psychical potentialities, and on the vastest of all—the limitless, in fact—that of spirit, the evidence of this cosmic action forces itself upon one's attention and strikes the thoughtful observer with awe. Each day brings its surprise, each month its contribution to the sum of human knowledge. Yesterday it was the phonograph, the telephone and the electric light, today it is startling discoveries in thought-transference and other phases of psychical science, the transmutation of sound into form and of color into sound. What it shall be tomorrow, who can guess? The one thing to rejoice the occultist is that each forward step which science takes brings man nearer the threshold of that "Borderland" beyond whose shadows the sun of spiri[illegible] truth is ever shining. To him, such phenomena as those of [illegible]iumship, hypnotism, clairvoyance, thought-transference, and t[illegible] of the quasi-physical class of

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